Season Preview and Other Thoughts

The NBA is back! At JPO, we have been watching the league’s doings with a half-dreamy and half-jaded eye since the Heat hoisted the O’Brien trophy last June. The coming season will be exhilarating, as the Heat try to repeat (which would constitute a ninth NBA championship ring for Pat Riley and a third for Dwyane Wade, quietly pushing the latter up the list of all-time great shooting guards); the Lakers try to unite four Hall of Famers for the second time in a decade; young players like Curry, Wall, Cousins, Irving, and Davis seek to fulfill their potential; and mid-tier teams like Chicago, New York, Indiana, Philadelphia, Memphis, Denver, and the Clippers aim to either leap to greatness or possibly dismantle their roster. For the record, I like Miami to win the title again in a rematch with Oklahoma City.

I want to address a distressing trend that continued this summer, however. For years several commentators have cried for the contraction of weak NBA teams that are generally terrible year after year, like Charlotte, Minnesota, or Golden State. The nature of basketball –- a 5-on-5 game potentially dominated by one side that fields the two best players -– makes it easy for a couple squads to collect most of the treasure year after year, and very hard to build a winning team, because the number of dominant studs (perhaps 10 or 15) is very small relative to the pool of all pro players (around 500 who are either rostered or hoping to regain a roster spot during a given season). Thus, the NBA sees the widest variance of results of any of the top North American sports leagues: the best two or three teams regularly win 75% or 80% of their games, while the worst teams win 20%. In baseball, say, the best team wins 60% of its games (winning 100 of 162 regular-season contests is a rare and historic achievement). Pro football often sees superlative (14-2) or putrid (2-14) records, but -– because (1) aggregate talent is more evenly matched in an 11-on-11 game, with separate platoons for offense and defense, and (2) non-guaranteed contracts make it easier for management to manipulate the roster each offseason -– the correlation of success from one season to the next is relatively weak. To consider the NFL’s NFC Central division, Green Bay finished 15-1 in the 2011 campaign and now is 4-3 in 2012. The Detroit Lions, which started last season 10-5, subsequently lost 6 of 8 games in calendar year 2012. The Chicago Bears were 8-8 in 2011 and now stand at 5-1; Minnesota was a lousy 3-13 last year but has started this season 5-2. (The low sample size that comprises the NFL regular season –- only 16 games –- contributes to the seemingly sharp swings of performance from one year to the next. Within a given NBA season, many teams might experience something like a 3-13 stretch and a 5-2 stretch.)

If a few NBA teams could be eliminated and their best players handed to middle-class squads like Utah, Milwaukee, or Atlanta , the league might have greater equity of talent distribution, which would make more games 50-50 affairs. This past summer saw several trades that amounted to the fruits of a putative dispersal draft: Orlando dealt Dwight Howard and Most Improved Player Ryan Anderson, Phoenix contributed Steve Nash, Atlanta shipped out Joe Johnson, and Houston gave away all their veterans. And lo, the Magic, Suns, and Rockets are poised to be terrible this season; few fans aside from locals in those metropolises would mind if the teams disappeared. This experiment might be worthwhile if it helped some fringe playoff teams rise above their past mediocrity. But the recipients of these players were mostly not playoff hopefuls or the near-contenders like Memphis and Indiana mentioned above; rather, it was championship-caliber squads who swelled their ranks with top guys. Boston picked up former Finals starter Courtney Lee in a one-sided trade, Los Angeles added likely Hall of Famers Howard and Nash for only the weak-kneed Andrew Bynum and future draft picks; Brooklyn (née New Jersey) added Joe Johnson to a roster that already included past All-Stars Deron Williams and Gerald Wallace; and, just yesterday, Oklahoma City took perennial 20-point scorer Kevin Martin and two future lottery picks off Houston’s hands. (To be fair, Houston picked up budding star James Harden in the trade, so the deal was fair, but the Rox will struggle for a couple years with a bevy of young players. 22-year-old Harden similarly struggled in the Finals last spring.)

Let us consider Las Vegas’s odds** on particular teams to win the 2013 NBA championship:

Miami – 9:4 (31% chance)

L.A. Lakers – 11:4 (27% chance)

Oklahoma City Thunder – 17:4 (19% chance)

Boston Celtics – 16:1 (6% chance)

Chicago Bulls – 16:1 (6% chance)

San Antonio Spurs – 16:1 (6% chance)

The Clippers have roughly a 4% chance in this scheme, and every other team has yet slimmer odds. If I am a typical parochially-oriented fan and my favorite team’s chance of a championship is consistently less than 5% (and the Lakers, Celtics, and Spurs have hogged those odds tables for the last five years, while the Thunder will likely receive generous odds for the rest of this decade), why should I care? It is clear that without at least two All-NBA-caliber talents on a squad, a team’s goose is headed straight for the roaster. The Detroit Pistons of 2004 are commonly presented as the rare starless team that won a championship and managed to sustain contendership for several seasons, but they featured Ben Wallace (four All-NBA selections), Rasheed Wallace (four All-Star selections), and Chauncey Billups (five All-Star selections and three All-NBA selections).

If a team cannot snag a Hall of Fame-level player via draft or free agency, it has little hope of winning. Consider, for example, the Toronto Raptors. They won the NBA’s top draft pick in 2006, when the best players available were Andrea Bargnani, Adam Morrison, Tyrus Thomas, LaMarcus Aldridge, Brandon Roy, and Randy Foye. Had they won that pick in 2003 (James, Wade), 2004 (Dwight Howard), 2005 (Paul, Bogut, Williams), 2007 (Durant or even Oden, who likely could have seen a promising career with better medical treatment), 2008 (Rose, Westbrook, Love), or 2009 (Griffin), the Raptors might be building a championship squad now. They have never been able to draft a superstar, instead choosing secondary stars like Vince Carter and Chris Bosh who could not alone lead the team to relevancy and left the cold climes of T.O, barren of basketball lucre, at the first opportunity. The Raptors’ poor draft timing was not the “fault” of the organization, but the result is just as maddening. But that’s basketball, right? It’s a five-on-five game and a couple top guys are necessary and nearly sufficient to win. That has been true since Russell and Cousy clambered across the parquet in Boston .

A few prescriptions have been thrown out to prevent too much clustering of talent: a “franchise” tag, as the NFL uses, to deny free agency to one star per team (but this seems arbitrary and mean); financial incentives like the “luxury tax” to discourage high aggregate team salary (but the threshold for punishment has been set high enough relative to individual salaries so that three great players can still comfortably sit on one team’s payroll); and removing the cap on individual salaries. It is this final step that I am beginning to favor. Without an individual cap (the “max” rule), LeBron James would command at least $30 million in an open bidding war instead of $16 million. Adding Dwyane Wade next to him would put aggregate salary close to $60 million just for those guys, and even if the luxury tax line were retained at its current level (around $70 million) rather than reduced, no team could field a profitable and effective squad around these two players. Stars like James and Wade (or Durant and Westbrook) might agree to take a small bit less than $30 MM for the organization’s benefit, but the haircut would not be enough to make the union of two of these guys feasible. 

So those are my thoughts on an owners' agenda for the next collective bargaining round in a few years. The union would likely oppose this, because with the total nominal dollars of league-wide player salary essentially fixed by the CBA (it is a linear function of revenue, which no clever agent can do much to change), increasing salaries for a few superstars would mean a reduction of salary for everyone else.

At any rate, let's play ball! =========================================================
**These are not necessarily Vegas’s best guesses of probabilities, but rather the lines that bring in equal money on both sides of the respective bet. Perhaps bettors with parochial allegiances consistently over-rate their team’s chances, inflating the Vegas odds above the “true” value. I mention this largely to explain why the numbers sum to over 100%.

Phoenix is, er, Moving Up In The World

The Suns, previously scorned as a lottery consignee not worthy of Steve Nash's talents, are now 23-22 after defeating Houston by 13 tonight. The Suns have won 11 of 14 games and are now just 1 win back of Houston, which holds the 8th playoff position in the Western Conference. Lost earlier in the season, Coach Alvin Gentry has whipped his charges into shape by sitting free-agent disappointments from 2010 (Warrick, Childress), running his offense around pick-and-rolls with Marcin Gortat, and letting Jared Dudley bother opponents at both ends. Gentry, like Gregg Popovich in South Texas, wisely sits his older players at opportune moments; Nash and Grant Hill did not touch the floor last week in a road game against the Clippers, the middle frame of a back-to-back-to-back set. Stupendously, the Suns found a way to win the game anyway. And for Phoenix owner Robert Sarver, who values financial performance a bit more than other owners who crave a championship, a fringe playoff contender with Steve Nash on the roster puts more butts in seats than Sebastian Telfair and Markieff Morris would.

But Phoenix is not the only Western team to defy expectations. Utah, which was, following the February 2011 trade of Deron Williams, billed as a rebuilding team featuring four rookies or second-year players, also sits at 23-22 and will likely battle until late April for that final playoff spot. The Jazz's decision to sign veteran free agents Raja Bell and Josh Howard, and not to trade veterans Al Jefferson, Paul Millsap, and Devin Harris, looked questionable in the frenzied fortnight of roster building last December after the lockout. With so much young talent, Utah need not worry so much about winning games, went the thinking. But the strategy has paid off: Hayward, Favors, Burks, and Kanter are beginning to thrive, and occasional (but not daily) starts have helped them ease into stardom. Better to develop them in a winning culture than a Bobcats-like woebegone culture. And the flip side of amassing FOUR lottery picks is that more top young talent would do more harm than good, messing with floor chemistry and team economics. So Utah has no need to "tank" this season. And with the NCAA men's basketball tournament running this month, let us not forget that Hayward came within a few centimeters of leading his team to the national championship two years ago. That guy is really good!

Commitment-phobes Rule the League

In a normal offseason, contract extensions for 2008 draftees would have been completed by October 31st, 2011 and no later. However, thanks to the now-pummelled lockout, no transactions could be completed last summer, and the contract extension deadline has been moved to January 25th, i.e., tomorrow. Strangely, we have not heard much news of contract extensions lately: compare this to October of 2010, when Kevin Durant and Al Horford and Mike Conley, Jr. and Joakim Noah all extended their deals, or the fall of '09, when Rondo, Roy, Bargnani, Aldridge, and Rudy Gay all re-upped with their teams. Thus far, from among the 2008 draftees, only Derrick Rose and Russell Westbrook have signed contract extensions, both committing through the 2016-17 season. What of the un-extended players?

Let us consider every first-round draft pick from 2008 (different contract rules apply to second-rounders), ignoring Rose and Westbrook. I will ignore players who have not succeeded as regular rotation members: this set includes Joe Alexander, Anthony Randolph, Marreese Speights, Alexis Ajinca, Kosta Koufos, and J.R. Giddens. (Of late, Speights has earned some starting time in Memphis, but that is due to injuries to the Grizzlies' two other power forwards, Darrell Arthur and Zach Randolph. Speights earned no floor time in Philadelphia, a young team with no backup big men.)

Michael Beasley: This is an easy one. Beasley has proved personally and athletically mercurial. The Timberwolves have a power forward from the 2008 draft in Kevin Love (discussed below), a small forward from the 2010 draft in Wesley Johnson, and a "tweener" forward from the 2011 draft in Derrick Williams. With this array of talent, the Wolves need not keep Beasley beyond this season (recall that they obtained him in 2010 for merely a second-round draft pick, so they have little psychological investment in him). Perhaps they could try to trade him during this season, or next July in a sign-and-trade when he becomes a restricted free agent.

O.J. Mayo: Despite frequent trade rumors during the past 12 months, Mayo contributed to Memphis's surprising playoff run last spring and is sniping the ball with rare accuracy this season. The Grizzlies reportedly will not extend his contract this week, but they still hope he will stay around for a few more years. This is likely a wise move; Mayo will expect money worthy of the third pick in the draft, but with Tony Allen expertly manning the shooting guard position with "grit and grind" for Memphis, paying him that salary would be daft. Mayo will likely command more in the restricted-free-agent market than Grizzlies management wishes to pay him.

Kevin Love: Well, of course. If the insane scoring and rebounding are not persuasive, how about the unusually skilled passing and shooting for a big man? The Timberwolves reportedly will offer Kevin Love a four-year extension through 2015-16. SI.com's Zach Lowe assesses this potential deal and finds it fair. If the Wolves' refusal to include a fifth year deters Love from signing, general manager David Kahn should be fired. At any rate, NBA.com's Steve Aschburner has a good discussion, published here today, of the negotiating dynamics between Love and the team.

Danilo Gallinari: After the trade of Carmelo Anthony, Gallo has emerged as Denver's best player. He scored 37 points in a double-OT win over Anthony and the Knicks last Saturday -- "out-Meloing Melo", as the Denver Post termed it. Denver has a strong young core with Ty Lawson, Nene Hilario, Corey Brewer, and Arron Afflalo already under contract (and Wilson Chandler likely returning soon). Extend Gallinari and continue developing a roster of swift young colts.

Eric Gordon: Gordon has been injured with a bad knee for most of this young season, and he missed 20 games in 2009-2010 and 26 games in 2010-11. His fragility can't help his case. Still, in his third season with the Clippers, he averaged 22 points and over 4 assists, dueling with James Harden for the honor of best young shooting guard in the league. He is the Hornets' best player, though he was unhappy about being pushed out of Los Angeles and reportedly felt in December like leaving New Orleans as soon as possible. More recently, with big money about to slip through his fingers and wash over the deadline cliff, Gordon has expressed interest in signing an extension. With the Hornets co-owned by the other 29 owners, however, and the joint owners trying to minimize long-term financial obligations for the next owner, team GM Demps has a difficult time negotiating and executing big transactions like this one, as we saw in the Chris Paul trade talks. If I were Demps and I had any kind of authority, I would ink Gordon to a contract extension. The injuries are worrisome, but it has been a different body part in each season (groin, wrist, knee) and he can really go when healthy.

D.J. Augustin: Augustin has played decently this season (check his numbers) but the Bobcats' drafting of NCAA champion Kemba Walker does not evince much confidence in Augustin at the point guard position. The Bobcats hardly know if their team can win more than ten games this season or next. Extending Augustin would be a mistake.

Brook Lopez: This one perplexes me. Why hasn't NJ signed Lopez to a speedy re-up? New Jersey wants to trade Lopez for Dwight Howard. But Lopez is of little value to Orlando if not signed beyond 2011-12. If Lopez wanted to leave Orlando, then under the CBA rules, Lopez could accept Orlando's qualifying offer for 2012-13, then sign anywhere as an unrestricted free agent in July of '13. Sure, Lopez would be leaving some money on the table in 2012-13 and risking that injury during the 2012-13 campaign might ruin his long-term value. But under league rules, a determined player can leave his team fairly readily. So again, why would Orlando trade for a player whose contract will soon end? New Jersey should extend Lopez's contract if it is at all serious about building a winning squad. He is the best player on the team save Deron Williams, and Williams looks set to leave later this summer as an unrestricted free agent if the team cannot land Howard. So if the Nets can trade for Howard, an extended Lopez is valuable; and if the Nets cannot trade for Howard, an extended Lopez is still valuable. Do this deal. Lopez's broken foot is worrisome, but this injury should not dog him beyond this season.

Jerryd Bayless: No. Amazing to think that Bayless and Westbrook were considered interchangeable options leading up to the '08 draft.

Jason Thompson: Thompson has drifted in and out of the Kings' starting lineup during the past four years. Sacramento now fields two power forwards from the 2008 draft, in Thompson and J.J. Hickson (mentioned below). They surely cannot extend both-- but could they extend one and not the other? That sounds disastrous for team chemistry, and probably not justified on basketball grounds, as neither player has consistently excelled. Put it this way: Could Thompson or Hickson be a starter on a championship-level team? Well, Hickson actually did start for a title contender in Cleveland in 2010, so I suppose anything is possible, but neither man has impressed much in Sacramento. I would wait to see how Thompson and Hickson perform with DeMarcus Cousins in new coach Keith Smart's system before making long-term decisions on their contracts.

Brandon Rush: Rush, the 13th pick in the 2008 draft, is a middling bench player for Golden State, having been recently traded from Indiana for "energy guy" Louis Amundson, who brings little more than defensive disruption. Rush is performing well this year, shooting the ball at 50% from the field and over 50% from 3-point range, but he looks at Monta Ellis manning his position during player introductions every night. Nor is Rush a handy sixth starter like Jason Terry or James Harden: Rush hardly rebounds or assists, and he failed to impress while starting for Indiana last season. So long as the Warriors remain committed to Ellis, extending Rush would be a mistake.

Roy Hibbert: The local paper in Indy reports that the Pacers will not offer Hibbert an extension. Odd decision, as the Georgetown product is killing it this season, most recently helping his team edge out the Lakers by 2 points on Sunday in Staples Center. Hibbert averages 14 points, 10 rebounds, 1.5 blocks, and a number of defensive intimidations every night. The Pacers have a solid young roster with Darren Collison, Tyler Hansbrough, George Hill, Paul George, and Hibbert. (Other starters Danny Granger and David West are still solidly in their prime, but could not be reasonably deemed "young".) I can't understand why the Pacers would not want to lock up Hibbert, unless they are seeking to retain salary-cap room for a significant free-agent signing (Eric Gordon? Heck, Dwight Howard?) later this summer.

Robin Lopez: With Marcin Gortat excelling as their starting center, Lopez is not a vital cog to the Suns. And team president Lon Babby told a reporter yesterday that he does not intend to extend Lopez.

JaVale McGee: McGee is the Wizards' only young big man with promise (I exclude Andray Blatche from that category). Though his defense positioning is sometimes wanting, he averages 11 points, 9 rebounds, and 3 blocks in this young season, making him statistically an apparent top-10 center. (For the curious, the others would include Dwight Howard, Andrew Bynum, DeAndre Jordan, Marc Gasol, Andrew Bogut, Samuel Dalembert, Marcin Gortat, Al Jefferson, and Roy Hibbert, with Tyson Chandler just excluded.) The Wizards fired their coach, Flip Saunders, earlier today after a 2-15 start. With a new helmsman taking over in DC today, perhaps McGee will further develop his offensive game. However, I don't believe McGee should be rewarded at this time for contributing to such a wretched squad. The Wizards can likely retain McGee by matching any offer sheet he signs as a restricted free agent this July.

J.J. Hickson: See Thompson discussion above.

Ryan Anderson: Another writer has already considered the question of Anderson's extension: Oh hell, yes. With Dwight Howard, Anderson is a terror on the perimeter and a solid rebounder. Extending him could help persuade Howard to stay past this season. Without Dwight Howard, Anderson's role could shrink, as he has not yet developed much of a post-up or face-up game. Anderson is a good man to have on your roster with Dwight Howard in the middle, but I cannot determine his value in the counterfactual world without Howard. (As a Net rookie in 2008-09, his numbers were poor in 20 MPG, but [A] he was a rookie, and [B] it was the Nets.) Strangely, I have not read any reports of a looming contract extension for him. The case is close, but given the uncertainty over Howard's tenure, I would not extend Anderson. Likely, the team can match a RFA offer for him next summer.

Courtney Lee: Lee started on Orlando's 2009 Finals team (and nearly won Game 2 against the Lakers with a spectacular inbound oop-to-layup play that tragically failed) before he was deemed expendable the following summer, traded for Vince Carter. Since then, Lee was a reliable starter for the 2009-10 Nets, but got traded again in the fall of 2010 as part of the four-team, five-man Hornets-Pacers-Nets-Rockets trade. In Houston, Lee has struggled to find playing time behind wing players such as Kevin Martin, Shane Battier, Chase Budinger, and now Chandler Parsons. If you can't beat out a Chase and a Chandler, you may not be that good. And Lee, who played four years in college, is already 26 and may not have much more improvement in him. Needless to say, an extension would be foolish. Here, though, is perhaps the highlight of Lee's career:

Serge Ibaka: On a team with two offensive powerhouses, Ibaka plays his role very well: he cleans up missed shots and defends opposing forwards when the slender Kevin Durant cannot. He also produces about 2 blocks per game. Ibaka likely will develop his offensive game further in coming seasons (he is still only 22) but the Thunder seem to win quite well with him right now. Ibaka's contract should be extended... but actually, he will not be eligible for a contract extension until the 2012 offseason, because he did not actually debut in the NBA until November of 2009. Basketball common sense says that the Thunder should certainly extend both Ibaka and Harden later this year, but a P&L statement (with limited revenue in a relatively small market, the Thunder owners simply may not want to add so much salary and luxury tax to their payroll) may decide the team's move.

Nicolas Batum: A January 13th report in The Oregonian mentioned negotiations on Batum's extension, but nothing has been concluded yet (a report yesterday indicated that talks continue). Still just 23, Batum has been a sometime starter during his career; this season, Gerald Wallace has supplanted him as the Blazers' starting small forward, though the limited availability of Marcus Camby and the non-availability of Greg Oden has created starter-level minutes for Batum. (It helps that LaMarcus Aldridge can shift to center and Wallace to PF when needed.) While not a dominant scorer like other small forwards (see Gallinari, above), Batum is deadly from 3-point land and shoots free throws at a very high percentage. His long arms also make him a plus defender. With the Portland future of Camby and Oden highly questionable, Aldridge's future may be as a center-- and thus Batum should be pencilled in as the Blazers' small forward of the present and future. With Ray Felton's contract expiring this June, Portland has salary-cap flexibility. Extend quick Nic!

George Hill: Reports indicate that the Pacers are discussing the sketches of an extension with Hill's agent. While Hill, who shoots a stellar percentage for a guard, has outperformed Brandon Rush (whom Hill basically replaced as the first guard off the bench in Indiana), I would not extend Hill at this time; budding star Paul George already plays his position. With George's height, he appears bound for a SF role, which would mean the expulsion of Danny Granger-- perhaps for a true shooting guard. At any rate, the Pacers have been very financially careful in recent years since breaking up the Artest-Tinsley-Jackson-O'Neal team, and George Hill, while a very good player, is not worth the obligation it would cost them. They can probably lock up Hill at a reasonable price as a restricted free agent next July, after carefully considering what to do with their current roster.

Darrell Arthur: Arthur was a very good first big man off the bench last season for Memphis. However, he unfortunately tore his Achilles tendon last month and will miss the whole season. Were he healthy and still producing, I might advocate an extension, but his injury makes this decision clear.

Donte Greene: Greene has shown little excellence in any skill during his four years in Sacramento; he could not beat out Omri Casspi or Travis Outlaw as the team's small forward, and he consistently shoots over two 3-pointers nightly despite a 30% (or less) success rate. Not a chance.

D.J. White: White, formerly a benchwarmer in Oklahoma City, has received stepped-up exposure this season for the woeful Bobcats. White can ball (10 points and 5 rebounds in 25 MPG) but with Tyrus Thomas also on the roster, an extension for White seems ill-advised at this time, especially with only a dozen games to judge him on.

So to review, I am recommending extensions for six players in addition to Rose and Westbrook: Love, Gallinari, Gordon, Brook Lopez, Hibbert, & Batum. While eight extensions is more than previous draft classes enjoyed, the '08 draft was unusually deep. Why not?

More Changes In The Association This Season

Today the NBA announced two important sets of changes for the 2011-12 season: one impacting on-court play, and one impacting off-court business matters. Both developments are positive, in my view.

The CBA
The new Collective Bargaining Agreement contains tweaks to numerous league protocols. Notably, the new CBA allows a player to renegotiate an existing contract for lower annual money but more years, if the annual salary reduction is no more than 40%. This provision would allow, say, Amare Stoudemire and Carmelo Anthony to take a bit less money in 2012-13 and beyond in order to create more salary-cap room for the Knicks to sign Chris Paul or another top free agent. [Reports Thursday indicate that the Knicks intend to sign Tyson Chandler to a large long-term contract that would cover 2012-13 and beyond. The contracts of those three guys would eat up most of the $58 MM salary cap. Theoretically, all three of Chandler, Stoudemire, and Anthony could agree to reduce their salaries sufficiently to make room for Paul at a large number; perhaps each of them could earn $13 MM annually, say.]

The new deal also sets the minimum team salary at (after a couple years of transition) 90 percent of the salary cap, rather than 75 percent. This provision will help further the goal of competitive balance; cheap owners such as Donald Sterling or Glen Taylor will be forced to hire at least a few middling (as opposed to terrible or very young) players to fill out their roster.

The contentious minimum age for draftees was not changed, but apparently punted to be decided by a future union-league committee. I have previously advocated in this space for the age limit to be raised to two years post-college.

GAME RULE CHANGES
The previously over-generous shooting fouls granted in "rip-through" or "and-one" situations, wherein the shooter was clearly not in a shooting motion before the foul, will be curtailed. Travelling rules will be enforced more strictly (LeBron James's "crab dribble", which we reviewed in this post in 2009, will no longer be legal) and timeouts will be made to conform to the billed 20-second or 60-second lengths. Here at JPO, we have long criticized inconsistent rule enforcement, and this news begets great happification in our hearts.

Worry Not, Flyover Fans

I was on a long trip abroad and somewhat physically infirm for the past couple weeks, but a lot happened in NBA circles. The remnants of the players' union finally agreed with the owners on the framework of a new Collective Bargaining Agreement, and the lockout is more-or-less now over. Immediately thereafter, rumors began flying about potential trade destinations for Chris Paul and Dwight Howard, who will be free agents next summer and don't seem inclined to re-sign with their respective current teams.

Fans of teams in smaller burgs tend to lament the inevitable loss of star players. But, first, the loss is not inevitable: Tim Duncan stayed in San Antonio, Kevin Durant seems bound to remain in OKC, and Isiah Thomas spent a whole career in Detroit. And consider that Kevin Garnett stayed in Minnesota for 12 years; save for one year when Sam Cassell played like an All-Star, the team could not assemble quality talent around him. 12 seasons was more than Garnett owed to the team.

Secondly, if your team loses a star, another will come soon enough. Orlando lost Shaq and Penny; Hill and McGrady soon replaced them. When they proved too brittle for the job, Dwight Howard and Rashard Lewis rolled into town. Minnesota lost Garnett and now has Love. The Kings of Sacramento once had a robust Webber; now they have a rambunctious Cousins. The annual draft that assigns the best talent to the worst teams tends to do that. Toronto lost Vince Carter but found themselves nurturing a college-aged Bosh. Bosh left, but now Jonas Valanciunas seems poised to shine in T.O. [Toronto is hardly a small market, but its relative unattractiveness for American players makes it comparable to Detroit or Orlando.]

Consider the recent plight of the Grizzlies, a 1995 expansion team. Originally based in Vancouver, the team held Top-6 draft positions every year from 1995 through 2003*, drafting Bryant Reeves, Shareef Abdur-Rahim, Antonio Daniels, Mike Bibby, and Stromile Swift along the way. Steve Francis, drafted at #2 in 1999, actually refused to play for the team, exhibiting the same Canuckophobia discussed above. Despite the repeated lottery picks, Vancouver could not build a winning team, mostly due to a poor overall talent level in the draft in those years. (None of Vancouver's draft picks could be derided as obviously terrible. They missed Kevin Garnett by just one draft position; nobody thought Kobe Bryant would be a superstar in '96; the '97 draft pool was terrible; and Mike Bibby had won a college championship while Paul Pierce had not. The 2000 draft was possibly the worst ever.) Owner Michael Heisley could not make the economics of pro hoops work in Vancouver, so he moved the team to another relatively small market, Memphis.

*Memphis's 2003 first-round pick, which obtained as #2 in the lottery, was traded to Detroit.

Heisley and his management were determined to start freshly in their new home. The '01 draft night served up a bounty for the Grizzlies, as they acquired rookie Shane Battier with their lottery pick and rookie Pau Gasol via a trade of Abdur-Rahim. Later that summer, they swapped Bibby for Sacramento's flashy disher, Jason Williams. Gasol won Rookie of the Year that season, and this core of players (plus the aforementioned Swift) was able to reach the playoffs in three consecutive springs from 2004 through '06. Unfortunately, the Grizzlies got swept each time, out-talented by Tim Duncan, Steve Nash, and Dirk Nowitzki. After three straight playoff failures, Gasol wanted out; the team had no apparent intention of improving the roster, and Gasol wanted to win. Memphis sought his exit, also: he was clearly not good enough to captain a championship team, and Memphis had no obvious means of acquiring a better superstar with Gasol on the roster.

Thus, starting in '06, the Grizzlies jettisoned their playoff roster and began rebuilding the team. They traded Battier for a draft pick that became one-and-done college prospect Rudy Gay; they acquired Mike Conley in the '07 draft; they traded Paul Gasol for the draft rights of his brother, Marc Gasol; they drafted O.J. Mayo and Darrell Arthur in the talent-laden 2008 draft; and they later drafted Sam Young, Greivis Vazquez, and Xavier Henry. Those are eight players who began their careers with Memphis and are still part of the team. Combined with veteran Zach Randolph, acquired in a 2009 trade, and defensive ace Tony Allen, signed as a free agent last year, the Grizzlies now have a deadly core that can contend for championships for the next few years. Taken seriously by no one, they rolled over the 4-time champion Spurs and nearly made the Western finals last spring.

Twice now, the Grizzlies have restocked their roster with new stars. Fans in Memphis were despondent one year ago, fearing their team might be contracted, but now they have reason for glee. Even fans in Vancouver need not mope; their city might one day get a new or existing NBA team, notwithstanding the earlier divorce.

The lesson here is that smart roster management can sustain a great team in a small market. Dumb roster management, such as the Timberwolves under Kevin McHale, will lead to naught.

Hail to the Mavs, Hardly A Team of Lovable Losers

So the Dallas Mavericks closed out Miami Sunday night to claim their first NBA championship. I was touched by a few sights: Dirk Nowitzki walking off the court before the final buzzer, unable to contain his emotions; Chris Bosh bitterly covering his face as he walked to the locker room, feeling the mirror of what Nowitzki felt; and Mark Cuban bringing in Donald Carter to receive the Larry O'Brien trophy. Many have long thought that Nowitzki and Jason Kidd, at the least (not to mention several of Dallas's other veterans) deserved a championship to cap their careers. However, team prizes are not given to individuals for lifetime achievement; the LOB must be earned by playing the best basketball of any team in the league. This year, that was Dallas, which outpointed the two-time defending champs, the anointed team of the future, and the league's most talented team on its way to the 2011 title.

It is interesting how this year's two Finalists represented a fairly clean break from the playoff behemoths of the last several seasons. After the memorable NBA Finals series of 2006 that matched these two teams, Dwyane Wade and Dirk Nowitzki struggled for the next few seasons while the Spurs, Suns, Lakers, Cavs, Pistons, Magic, and Celtics cleaned up in the playoffs. Wade's team lost three first-round series in the subsequent four years (including an embarrassing sweep by the young Bulls in 2007) and missed the playoffs in 2008. Nowitzki's Mavs lost three first-round series in the next four campaigns and lost in the second round in '09. In the press conference before Game 6, Nowitzki described the annual "hammering" that superstars receive from fans and pundits when they fail to end their season with a win.

Yet as Scoop Jackson points out here, those same observers tend to forget the years of futility once a team finally does win the sweetest prize. Jackson does not delve into the psychology of those analysts, but perhaps it is a case of the "fundamental attribution error" recognized by formal psychology: observers want to place Nowitzki, say, into one of a small number of personality types. They want to say he is soft, or tough, or killer, or clutch, or weak, or overconfident, or smart, or selfish, or stupid. They want to consider him as possessing such attribute innately and forever, rather than considering that he may possess many of these types, and his types might change over time. They also fail to note that contingent, situational factors outside the superstar's grasp like injuries, playoff upsets to other contenders, lucky roster moves, and the like can spell the difference between a championship or none, regardless of how well the star plays. Coupled with the natural psychological tendency to consider recent data and positive data (compared to old and negative data) more keenly, this makes it easy for observers to now consider Dirk a "winner", instead of updating their view of his career in a more nuanced fashion. Nowitzki actually seems canny, from this perspective, to a win a title later in his career rather than earlier; Wade, who won his lone title (the same number as Nowitzki) in his third year, now has to answer more questions about his winning capacity than Mr. Swish41 does.

Dallas is hardly a cuddly underdog: their aggregate player salary of about $84 MM for the 2010-11 season ranks third in the league. The internet mania of the late 1990s gave Mark Cuban a lot of money; he is one billionaire who seems to value winning over turning an economic profit on his team, to the extent that those two objectives clash, as I discussed a couple years ago. Dallas lost two-time All-Star Caron Butler to injury in January, and was able to fill his SF slot in the starting lineup with... four-time All-Star Shawn Marion! To plug Marion's spot as backup small forward, Dallas signed... three-time All-Star Peja Stojakovic. When Stojakovic's defense against Miami's star wings proved terrible in the Finals, Dallas was able to spell him with their fourth-string small forward, Brian Cardinal, a former $40 MM backup for Memphis. Dallas also boasts FOUR starting-caliber point guards, two starting-caliber centers, and a former Final Four MVP in Corey Brewer, who barely played in the playoffs. Due to arcane NBA rules dealing with player movement, Cuban even paid over $2 MM this season to three players (Buckner, Novak, Thomas) With a owner like Cuban, Dallas should always be in the upper layer of teams. Even when Nowitzki slows and retires, top players should be keen to play for a big-spending owner who funds sleek locker rooms.

Many commenters are fussing that Miami's roster is fatally flawed and the Bosh-Wade-James troika should be broken up. But by most teams' standards, the Heat had a wildly successful season, finishing with the third-best record in the league and blitzing 12-3 through the Eastern playoffs. In the Finals, their lack of a good center hurt them, as Tyson Chandler was able to discourage any offensive forays down low by the three Heat stars, without worrying about Joel Anthony doing much left unattended. A summer of shooting practice by the two wing stars, plus the addition of a good two-way 7-footer younger than 35, plus a full training camp (recall that Wade was injured throughout last October) will help Miami improve, and they should rightly be considered next year's title favorites. There will be many free-agent centers in July [or after the completion of a labor agreement] including Sam Dalembert, Marc Gasol, Greg Oden, Yao Ming, Spencer Hawes, Nene Hilario, and the aforementioned Chandler. However, any center with his eyes on Miami will need to accept relatively low pay: Miami can offer only the mid-level exception [i.e. league average] salary, or if that option is killed in the new labor agreement, then perhaps just the veteran's minimum, to free agents.

Congratulations to Dallas!

Streaks of Great Seasons Are Bigger In Texas

A few quick points in response to John Hollinger's latest column on ESPN about the remarkable decade-long success of the Mavericks and Spurs.

1. It is not likely that Dallas regrets the effective swap of Steve Nash for Erick Dampier back in the summer of 2004. The Mavs got to the NBA Finals in 2006 and then amassed the best record in '07 without Nash. Nash is a fine point guard who excels in the open system of Mike D'Antoni and Alvin Gentry system, but he suffers on the defensive side of the court and surely would not have thrived under Avery Johnson.

2. Hollinger ponders why there is no training academy for new NBA owners. Existing owners have no incentive to educate new owners on good management practices. In the McDonald's regime, every franchisee wants to keep the quality of the McD brand high; incidents of scalding coffee or French fries cooked with pig lard are not good for business. And each McDonald's store is not competing with another; each outlet tends to be at least one mile away from the nearest saffron arch. In the NBA, however, the league's reputation is not harmed much if Minnesota fields a crummy team; a few instances of abysmality are expected by nation-wide fans. Additionally, teams are competing against each other, at least in basketball terms.

3. Finally, Hollinger says that the probability of a randomly selected team winning 50 games, then doing it again the following year has historically been about 70%. Thus, the chance of ten consecutive 50-win repeats is some tiny fraction. That is a fine approach to elementary statistics. However, we are not considering the case of a randomly selected team of unknown identity. We're talking about the MAVS and the SPURS. These teams have not merely strung together a crazy, fluky, hot streak with tons of lucky breaks. Based on what we know about the quality of their organizations, we should update our estimate of their probability of attaining repeat 50-win seasons. In other words, by now we should not be surprised.

Knowing When To Fold 'Em

ESPN.com's Henry Abbott today posits that NBA teams are, in recent years, quicker to give up on high draft picks compared to the good old days. Is this really so? Abbott declines to give one bit of evidence for his position.

Looking at the top 11 picks in the seven drafts from 2003-2007, I find the following players who were traded, or non-renewed, by their original teams within three years after the draft. (I am not counting any player who was traded on draft day or very shortly thereafter by the team that drafted him. I am defining "original team" to mean the team that the player suited up with in his first training camp.)

2003: Darko Milicic, TJ Ford, Michael Sweetney
2004: Luke Jackson, Rafael Araujo
2005: Ike Diogu
2006: Adam Morrison, Randy Foye, Shelden Williams, Patrick O'Bryant, Mouhamed Sene
2007: Yi Jianlian, Spencer Hawes, Acie Law
2008: Michael Beasley, Joe Alexander, Jerryd Bayless
2009: Terrence Williams

That is 18 guys out of 77, or 23%.

What of the seven drafts from 1996-2002?
1996: Marcus Camby, Stephon Marbury, Lorenzen Wright, Samaki Walker, Todd Fuller
1997: Chauncey Billups, Antonio Daniels, Tony Battie, Ron Mercer, Tim Thomas, Danny Fortson, Tariq Abdul-Wahad
1998: Mike Bibby, Robert Traylor, Jason Williams, Larry Hughes
1999: Elton Brand, Rip Hamilton, Andre Miller, Trajan Langdon
2000: Darius Miles, Mike Miller, DerMarr Johnson, Jérôme Moïso
2001: Eddie Griffin, Rodney White, Joe Johnson, Kedrick Brown
2002: Drew Gooden, Nikoloz Tskitishvili, Dajuan Wagner, Caron Butler

That is 32 guys out of 77, or 42%.

It appears that, contra Abbott, team management have actually become LESS willing to part with lottery picks early in their career. Perhaps part of this dynamic can be explained by the more talent-rich drafts of recent years, compared to fin-de-siecle times. I cannot explain why the Jimmy Carter administration produced so few basketball-bound babies of star caliber, whereas the Reagan years of natality have been replete with talent. However, the trend is undeniable. 1996 was unquestionably a good draft year (three future MVPs in Iverson, Bryant, Nash, just to start) but most of the top picks in the immediate years after that were stiffs: Olowokandi, Marcus Fizer, Kwame Brown... But starting with 2003's cohort of James, Wade, Bosh, and Anthony, several Hall of Fame-caliber players have entered the league. Dwight Howard, Chris Paul, Deron Williams, Kevin Durant, Derrick Rose, and Blake Griffin all could be HOF-bound if they maintain their current pace for another decade. Why give up on players like that?

Whether the influx of talent masks a secular change in GM philosophy regarding young "busts" is hard to say.

The Last Jewel Tarnished In Detroit

I have long openly proclaimed my love for the Detroit Pistons, the team that tickled my solipsistic need for local grandeur as a young boy. Detroit won championships in 1989 and 1990, and then did it again in 2004 after I had grown to adulthood. During the recent fat days, I forgot how Detroit fell into a long period of mediocrity after Isiah Thomas and Bill Laimbeer retired in 1994 (and even in the last three years of their careers). Rookie Grant Hill's entry into the Pistons' starting lineup in November 1994 seemed to augur well for their recovery, but Terry Mills and Theo Ratliff were not sufficiently stout big men in the mid-to-late 1990s to help Detroit get past better Eastern teams like Orlando and Atlanta (to say nothing of Jordan's Chicago, Mourning's Heat, and Ewing's Knicks).

After six straight Eastern Conference Finals appearances in the decade just completed, the Pistons are now a team in terminal decline. They still field three-fifths of the starting lineup that won them a championship seven seasons ago (and lost in Game 7 of the Finals six seasons ago), but those men have lost their erstwhile vigor and hops. The team is now 0-5 after losing to Atlanta last night.

About 24 months ago, when the Piston's recent run of success ended with the trade of Chauncey Billups, I wrongly called team president Joe Dumars a genius. At the time, I thought the trade would allow Detroit's good fortune to endure for a few more seasons, but the team rapidly crashed, falling to the worst Eastern playoff seed in 2009 and missing the playoffs entirely in '10. Unfortunately, Rodney Stuckey just is not as good as Billups performed in his finest days. And the Pistons' recent draft picks have not soared: Jason Maxiell and Austin Daye are either too short or too thin, and Jonas Jerebko just tore his Achilles' tendon. Georgetown center Greg Monroe is yet unproven.

Somehow I feel a Dylan Thomas interlude would be appropriate here:

Managing an NBA roster long-term is difficult, for the assets have a unique inverted-U-shaped life cycle. Players tend to peak in about their sixth year, maintain that high for perhaps four years, then begin to slowly decline. At any given time, a roster is probably made up of heterogeneous players at different stages of their careers. If only a couple of your guys are declining, that is fine. If necessary, they can be traded as "expiring contracts" for better, younger players. But the Pistons' top six players during their six-year run of excellence (counting Antonio McDyess, who signed on prior to the 2004-05 season) were all drafted between 1995 and 1999, save for Tayshaun Prince, drafted in 2002. Prince was a four-year college player, so he is about as old as a college freshman drafted in 1999, like Lamar Odom. Thus, the team collectively aged very rapidly. Billups was dumped in 2008, and McDyess and Rasheed Wallace were shown the door in 2009. The remaining guys — Prince, Richard Hamilton, and Ben Wallace — can't do what they used to. I would eat my hat if Prince could replicate his famous block of Reggie Miller today.

I cannot say with great specificity how Dumars should have managed his team differently. He probably should have traded Prince and Hamilton one or two seasons ago, when they still were good. Dumars also has proven to be a poor judge of young talent, to say the least. Had he drafted Aaron Brooks over Rodney Stuckey in 2007, or Holiday/Lawson/Teague/Maynor/Collison/Douglas over Austin Daye in 2009, the team would have a legitimate point guard now. The team also had no meaningful draft pick in 2006 or 2008, which helped to preserve the roster's age distribution. Perhaps the team needs a 65-loss season to sink lower than their pride would previously allow them to venture, so that they can pick up a real stud through the draft.

Knicks Need To Get Real

Tony Parker signed a contract extension with San Antonio yesterday, removing one of the New York Knicks' top targets for next summer's free-agency cycle. Having promised their fans a quick return to glory redolent of Richard Nixon's first term, the Knicks need to get cracking. Unfortunately, posing a serious challenge to the Miami Heat over the next half-decade will require that the Knicks assemble a crew of all-NBA stars of comparable ability to James/Bosh/Wade, and few of those are available. The Knicks could have drafted Brandon Jennings, probably the best young point guard in the league, back in 2009, but instead chose Jordan Hill, who was later dumped in a trade and now rides the bench for Houston. The Knicks have several players with enough raw talent to make All-Star teams, including Danilo Gallinari, Wilson Chandler, and Anthony Randolph, but none have yet blossomed to that extent.

Many reports indicate that Carmelo Anthony is Manhattan bound, either through a trade this season or as a free agent next summer. Unfortunately, a team featuring Amar'e Stoudemire and Anthony will be offensively potent, but will not have anything close to the defensive ability required to seriously oppose Miami and Orlando. As this article makes clear, James and Wade are wholly dedicated to dominating any team on their defensive end, and are two of the four best offensive players in the league.

The Knicks probably hope they can somehow acquire Anthony and Chris Paul, who will be a free agent in 2012. But if Paul shows an inclination to sign a contract extension with the Hornets or join some other team, the Knicks might be wiser to look further west: Several 2007 draftees will be available as restricted free agents next July, including, inter alia, Greg Oden, the best two-way young center in the league, when he is healthy. (I am removing 24-year-old Dwight Howard from the "young" category, as he is now in his seventh pro season.) Oden's team chose not to extend his rookie contract, and he will surely be eager to prove himself during the coming season. The Knicks could make a splash by conveying to Oden an offer that Portland cannot fail to refuse.

Out With The Old, In With the Old in Miami

An October 10th article from the Orlando Sentinel claims that the Magic are "way ahead" of the Miami Heat in roster continuity. However, despite their high-profile free-agent signings, the Heat, surprisingly, may have more roster continuity from 2009-10 to 2010-11 than nearly any other NBA team.

Consider the following 2009-10 players who are under contract for the new season:
Dwyane Wade
Udonis Haslem
Mario Chalmers
Carlos Arroyo
Shavlik Randolph
Jamaal Magloire
Joel Anthony
Kenny Hasbrouck
James Jones

New players feature (i) two second-round draft picks, Dexter Pittman and Da'Sean Butler; (ii)several value free-agent signings — Zydrunas Ilgauskas, Eddie House, Juwan Howard, and Mike Miller; and (iii) oh yeah, LeBron James and Chris Bosh.

In addition, Coach Erik Spoelstra and team President Pat Riley remain in their posts.

To be fair, Hasbrouck and Randolph have non-guaranteed contracts, as do Pittman and Butler; two of those players will be cut in this month's training camp. However, if Hasbrouck and Randolph were to both make the team, a roster featuring 60% returning players is pretty good. No other top contender returns more than 10 players:

Lakers: Bryant, Fisher, Gasol, Bynum, Artest, Brown, Vujacic, Walton, Odom

Celtics: Rondo, Allen, Perkins, Pierce, Garnett, Robinson, Davis, Daniels

Magic: Nelson, Carter, Howard, Lewis, Pietrus, Bass, Anderson, Gortat, Williams, Redick

Spurs: Duncan, Ginobili, Parker, Jefferson, Blair, McDyess, Bonner, Hill

The Max is Too Much

Top free agents want to get the full amount they are entitled to. Based on a formula in Article II, Section 7(a) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, eighth-year players are entitled to a maximum salary of a bit over $17 million per year. To the extent that more than one team can create cap room to sign such a player, and the marginal revenue boost from signing a superstar is well in excess of his salary, a semi-competitive market will inevitably result in these contracts being signed.

Meanwhile, the NBA salary cap is about $58 MM for 2010-11, up very slightly from 2009-10. A team with no players under contract could afford to sign, at most, three maximum-salary players in one free-agency period. As it turned out, only Miami could do this in July 2010. A couple teams (New York, New Jersey, Chicago) had enough room, or close to it, for two maximum-salary players. But given the ceiling (which becomes an effective floor) on superstar salaries, most teams in the league had no shot at signing a Wade or James, or even a Boozer. Your typical star wants to play where other stars are playing, so two simultaneous signings seems to be required if you want just one.

There is an obvious coordination problem here: top players would behoove themselves to accept lower than the maximum allowed salary, in order to leave more salary-cap room (or if that is impossible, simply to be kind to the owner's wallet so he will be generous with Bird-exception-type or MLE-type signings) to sign good supporting teammates. But though some (like LeBron James, Dwyane Wade, and Chris Bosh in today's free agent machinations, or Kobe Bryant in 2004) speak of accepting less money for the good of the team, it rarely happens. James, Wade, and Bosh will, by accounts, get close to the max salary; why else would Miami trade a very good young player, Michael Beasley, for virtually nothing? Theory holds that wealth has diminishing marginal utility past a certain level of luxury, but athletes don't hesitate to demand their full allotment.

Obviously this system encourages building young talent through the draft, and retaining said talent, rather than cobbling together a monster through free-agent acquisitions. There are no Yankees in the NBA. But I favor either increasing the salary cap somewhat or reducing the maximum salary, to make it easier for more teams to get access to the "open" market for good players. Following a team is no fun if, like the Knicks, they are locked out of the free-agency market for years and, when finally they are allowed to deal in such market, they are structurally disadvantaged because some other team has more "max" slots.

Be Careful What You Wish For

Across the league, the new new thing in roster management is clearing salary obligations from the 2010-11 rolls in order to free up more capacity for signing superstar free agents. To wit:

The Chicago Bulls are reportedly set to trade Kirk Hinrich to Washington.

Meanwhile, Miami traded Daequan Cook yesterday, and today are trying to rid themselves of SF James Jones's contract.

We know how New York traded away Jared Jeffries and Jordan Hill in February.

New Jersey traded away Vince Carter last year and, just yesterday, Chris Douglas-Roberts.

All these teams are shedding guys who could be, or have been, productive contributors to a playoff team.

All these teams are hoping to land two or three of the top free agents in July: LeBron James, Dwyane Wade, Chris Bosh, Joe Johnson, Amare Stoudemire, Carlos Boozer, David Lee, Rudy Gay, Dirk Nowitzki, Ray Allen. (Steve Nash, Manu Ginobili, and Kobe Bryant already re-signed with their existing squads, removing some intrigue from the coming Julian dog days.)

Unfortunately, there is a good chance that at least one team will look back and found that it divested assets for nothing. What if James stays with Cleveland, Cleveland trades for Stoudemire, Boozer joins the Nets, Wade and Bosh sign with Miami, Lee and Johnson sign with the Knicks, and Gay/Nowitzki/Allen stay where they are. The Bulls would then be bereft of talent, with only Rose/Noah/Deng/Gibson/Johnson signed for next season. The second-tier selection of free agents is unlikely to net a big-time performer: Luis Scola or John Salmons (who was a Bull just four months ago) could help, but they will hardly help the team hang with the Lakers. Tracy McGrady was once great, but probably little more than a Vinnie Johnson now.

Alternatively, I could construct a scenario where the Knicks, or Heat, or Nets lose this derby. Fans will wonder: "Wait, all those years of suffering through mediocrity yielded absolutely nothing?"

Moreover, not only is it risky to part ways with a perfectly serviceable player based on a highly uncertain hope of upgrading, but hanging on to the player might be a higher-probability play if you hope to snare LeBron. Due to rules in Article IX of the NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, a free agent can make more money annually, and gain an extra (sixth) guaranteed year of salary, by signing with his own team, rather than joining a new one. Thus, Chicago or Miami might have a better shot at acquiring Chris Bosh, say, by including Daequan Cook or Kirk Hinrich in a "sign-and-trade" where Bosh technically re-signs with Toronto to garner that extra booty. The Raptors might prefer such an outcome, too, as they would gain some value for their lost star. Having dumped Hinrich, the Bulls no longer have that strategic option.

So many teams have expressly committed to a strategy of readying for LeBron that the bold move might entail not doing so. I respect the Timberwolves and Thunder, which have good young players and salary space for a star, but have said virtually nothing about signing a top free agent. At least they evince a belief that their own budding stars are good enough. (Why should we think that Bosh, Johnson, Boozer, Stoudemire, Lee, or Gay are any better? None of them has led a team to the NBA Finals.)

A further irony is that the Bulls are casting off Hinrich, a tough point guard who has completed seven seasons in Chicago, to make way for Wade or Bosh or James. Let us recall that the ex-Jayhawk, like those celebrated others, is a member of the 2003 draft lottery class. And unlike the other free agents save Wade and Boozer, Hinrich made the Final Four!

Kupchak Delivered These Titles

So the Los Angeles Lakers have won the 2010 NBA championship with a narrow Game 7 victory over Boston.

Of everyone in the Lakers' organization, the most underrated contributor to their recent run of success must be General Manager Mitch Kupchak, who is very, very good at his job. At the least, he should be deemed the Executive of the Half-Decade.

Trading Shaquille O'Neal in 2004 was wise, as it jump-started the inevitably required rebuilding of the erstwhile three-time titlists. The Lakers could have squeezed maybe a couple more title-contending years out of the Kobe-Shaq duo in 2005 and 2006, but O'Neal was growing increasingly contentious and unmotivated in L.A., on top of his natural aging process.

In that same summer, Kupchak elected not to re-sign Derek Fisher, as his gritty services would not be needed on a re-building team. Kupchak also traded Gary Payton and Rick Fox (likewise not needed) for Chris Mihm, a center who could replace O'Neal's services in the short term. The same trade also netted Chucky Atkins and Marcus Banks, young 1s who could replace the point guarding offered by Payton and Fisher. Atkins started every game of the 2004-05 season for Los Angeles, delivering a steady 14 PPG.

Lamar Odom, obtained from Miami in the O’Neal trade, was a good piece for a future title contender. Certainly not the second-best player on a champion, but as we have actually seen, he is an extremely valuable contributor.

One year later, in summer 2005, Kupchak realized he needed to gamble on some young big men with high upside; thus, he drafted Andrew Bynum and traded Caron Butler for Kwame Brown. Helped by tutoring from Kareem Abdul-Jabbar. Bynum developed into a championship-quality starting center (though he is injury-prone). Brown never improved much, though the Lakers were able to flip him (with a couple rookies and draft picks) for Pau Gasol halfway through the 2007-08 season.

Thus, the Lakers’ top 4 of Bryant, Gasol, Bynum, and Odom were set in February 2008. However, prior to that season, back in the summer of ’07, many pundits, and Kobe Bryant himself, questioned Kupchak’s long-term plan for returning the team to the top of the league, after three seasons without a playoff series win. “Ship his ass out!” Bryant pleaded ironically (referring to Bynum, in a putative trade for Jason Kidd) while kibitzing with two random dudes in a parking lot, as though Bryant himself were just a beer-bellied couch potato with opinions on everything hoopish.

In the 7 months following that incident, Kupchak refrained from the impulse to grant Bryant's trade request, then signed Derek Fisher, acquired Trevor Ariza by trade, then acquired Gasol in the 2008 trade that Gregg Popovich termed "beyond comprehension" for its one-sidedness.

Kupchak also proved a good drafter, taking Luke Walton in 2003, Sasha Vujacic in 2004, Bynum in 2005, and Jordan Farmar in 2006. All played meaningful minutes in the 2009 and 2010 Finals.

Finally, Kupchak has looked for only the highest caliber of coach. In 2004 he signed two-time championship coach Rudy Tomjanovich, and when he resigned in 2005 for personal reasons, Kupchak re-signed nine-time titlist Phil Jackson. Jackson may retire this summer, and if that happens, Kupchak would be wise to sign Byron Scott, former three-time champ as a player, two-time Finalist as a coach, and 2008 Coach of the Year.

Fisher and Farmar will be free agents come July and may not return; the Lakers may need to find a higher-caliber point guard. But with all the above-mentioned players, plus 2009 free agent acquisition Ron Artest, the Lakers seem poised to win at least one more title in the next three seasons, before the contracts and health of their top guys begin to expire. Kupchak has shown a golden touch since Shaquille O'Neal left. The challenge will be to find the next generation of Laker superstars when Bryant and Gasol eventually retire.

KG Deserved Better

Nearly three years after Kevin Garnett joined the Celtics, I still find it difficult to watch this short promotional spot and not feel a tear fighting its way through my ducts.

However, beyond the emotional wallop, what are we to make of this video? If, as seems apparent from the branding, the NBA and not the Celtics is the voice behind this advertisement — and thus, if NBA fans en masse, rather than Celtics fans, are the target audience — exactly what value proposition is the league trying to sell me on? Is the league telling me that, as a putative fan of any randomly-selected team, I have hope that a superstar may one day come to my team by trade? Well, that's not credible; in recent years, the big trades of MVP-caliber players have involved Jason Kidd to New Jersey, Shaq to Miami, McGrady to Houston, Garnett to Boston, and Pau Gasol to the Lakers. In other words, talented teams in big cities picked up more talent. A Memphis or Milwaukee fan sees little inspiration from this set of facts.

On the other hand, perhaps the message is "If you follow a highly talented player, rest assured that he will eventually find his way to a winning team." This has generally proved true over the years: Besides the examples above, Bob McAdoo joined the Lakers, Charles Barkley joined Phoenix, and Chris Bosh seems poised to join a contender next month. However, this argument collapses of its own weight. The NBA markets stars. Unlike the other major team sports in the United States, the NBA's players wear no headgear shrouding their features. Jersey sales, ticket prices, and TV ratings are generally driven by the appearance of great players in attractive situations. Dwyane Wade seems far more exciting when flanked by Shaquille O'Neal and Gary Payton than he did in the past couple seasons, when he led Joel Anthony and Mario Chalmers into opposing arenas. The Garnett ad above implicitly admits that the Association failed, for 11 of his 12 Timberwolf seasons (excluding the highly successful 2003-04 Minnesota campaign featuring Cassell, Sprewell, Szczerbiak, though even then the team's aggregate talent was middling), to put Garnett into a situation where he could thrive. Should we now applaud the league for giving us a product that includes Garnett as a winner? That is like thanking BP for cleaning up their oil spill.

And this brings me to the upcoming free-agent signing season. For months and possibly years, fans of mediocre teams such as Chicago, New York, Miami, Oklahoma City [though they have moved past "mediocre" now] Sacramento, Minnesota, Washington and the LA Clippers have anticipated July 2010 as a chance to upgrade their roster's core identity in a single swoop, like Dennis Quaid changing his face in Innerspace. But what if none of the top free agents move? It is conceivable that James, Wade, Nowitzki, Johnson, Stoudemire, Boozer, Lee, Gay, Allen, and McGrady could all remain with their current teams. Already, possible free agents Nash, Bryant, and Ginobili re-signed with their teams before their contracts expired. The only near-certainty seems to be Chris Bosh leaving Toronto. If this stagnancy happens, for many fans it would be a lump of coal at the bottom of a brightly adorned Christmas stocking hung on the chimney with care.

From Draft Day to LOB Day

While watching San Antonio win its playoff series against Dallas last night, I noted that the Spurs have a whopping five players in their rotation whom they originally drafted: Duncan, Parker, Ginobili, Hill, and Blair. Other than Duncan (1997 #1), all the others were late first-round picks or second-round picks. They surely must have the best scouting department in the league.

By contrast, the Thunder, the NBA's youngest team, also have several regulars whom they drafted, but almost all in the lottery: Westbrook, Harden, Collison, Durant, Green, Ibaka. (Collison, as we noted in this 2008 post, has been with the Sonics/Thunder franchise since 2003.)

Upon some tallying, as shown below, it seems that most playoff teams, even those perceived as "young" or "up and coming", have just 4 or 5 rotation players whom they drafted. The team with the greatest number of original draftees in its rotation turns out to be Portland, with 7.

Building a winning team mainly with draft picks is difficult, as it requires predicting on-court chemistry before players enter their prime, and really before they've even met each other. If you get your draft picks "right", as Oklahoma City and Portland have, then you can quickly win while paying cheap rookie salaries. If you screw up your picks, as Charlotte has (D.J. Augustin over Brook Lopez? Gerald Henderson over Ty Lawson?) then your re-building project will fail and you will be doomed to start over a few years hence. Aside from Portland and the Thunder, there are few playoff teams that have "grown up" together from draft day to huge postseason success. Most successful teams require a significant trade or free-agent signing (think Bill Cartwright to the Bulls, Dennis Rodman to the Bulls, Pau Gasol to the Lakers, Mark Aguirre to the Pistons, Rashard Lewis to the Magic) before they can fully ascend.

(For purposes of this list below, "drafted" includes trading for a player's rights shortly after some other team drafted him, as happened with Gortat, Hilario, Fesenko, Fernandez. This also includes the signing of undrafted free agents, such as Chris Andersen, J.J. Barea, Wesley Matthews, Udonis Haslem. This includes players presently injured but ordinarily part of the rotation such as Oden, Redd, Kirilenko. Finally, I am generously including players on their second stop with their original team, including PGs such as Kidd, Nash, Fisher.)

DRAFTED PLAYERS IN PLAYOFF ROTATIONS WITH THEIR ORIGINAL TEAM

Boston: Pierce, Rondo, Perkins, T.Allen, Davis

Orlando: Nelson, Howard, Redick, Gortat

Cleveland: James, Varejao, Ilgauskas, Hickson, occasionally Gibson

Atlanta: Williams, Horford, Smith, Teague

Miami: Wade, Wright, Haslem, Chalmers, Beasley, occasionally Cook

Milwaukee: Jennings, Bogut, Redd, Mbah a Moute, Ilyasova, Gadzuric

Charlotte: Wallace, Felton, Augustin

Chicago: Rose, Noah, Deng, Gibson, Hinrich (all NCAA standouts, as documented in our previous post here)

Los Angeles: Fisher, Bryant, Bynum, Walton, occasionally Vujaci

c

OKC: Westbrook, Harden, Collison, Durant, Green, Ibaka

San Antonio: Duncan, Parker, Ginobili, Blair, Hill

Phoenix: Nash, Stoudemire, Lopez, Dragic, Barbosa

Denver: Anthony, Hilario, Lawson, Andersen

Utah: Williams, Matthews, Fesenko, Kirilenko, Miles, Millsap

Dallas: Kidd, Nowitzki, Beaubois, Barea

Portland: Roy, Aldridge, Oden, Webster, Batum, Fernandez, Bayless

Assessing Executive Performances

In a series of three posts last year, we evaluated executive performance in 2008-09, ultimately choosing Denver's Mark Warkentien as the greatest achiever that year. Warkentien went on to win the NBA's Executive of the Year award.

This year's Executive of the Year was Milwaukee's John Hammond, who received 12 of 30 votes. The runner-up was Oklahoma City's Sam Presti, who received 9 votes. This was odd, given that (as described below) Presti did virtually nothing in the past 12 months to improve his team, other than prudent omission. It is generally recognized that the Coach of the Year award is not a prize for cumulative past deeds, but rather a bauble for punctuated single-year success (hence Jerry Sloan's failure to ever win), so why should Presti get any votes?
The voting year is generally considered to start with the 2009 NBA draft and extend until the end of the 2009-10 regular season in mid-April, when roster moves cease.

Hammond certainly has done a great job, as he built a deep and resilient roster that was able to weather season-ending injuries to Michael Redd and Andrew Bogut yet still (as of this writing) take 3 of the first 5 playoff games from the favored Atlanta Hawks. Still, I am not sure that he was the best team executive in the past 12 months.

Here are the candidates, arranged into tiers of Great, Good, OK, and Poor:

GREAT

Cleveland's Danny Ferry (drafted Christian Eyenga and Danny Green; traded Sasha Pavlovic and Ben Wallace for Shaquille O'Neal; signed Leon Powe, Anthony Parker, and Jamario Moon; traded Zydrunas Ilgauskas and a draft pick for Antawn Jamison). The trades for Shaq and Jamison were brilliant, losing no usable talent (note that Ilgauskas returned to the team 30 days after the trade) for multi-time All-Stars who help the Cavs credibly threaten Orlando. The free-agent signings of ex-Raptors Parker and Moon were also sharp, as Delonte West and LeBron James alone were not sufficient as perimeter defenders in the playoffs last year.

San Antonio's R.C. Buford (drafted Dejuan Blair, Garrett Temple, and Cedric Jackson; traded Fabricio Oberto/Kurt Thomas/Bruce Bowen for Richard Jefferson; brought Ian Mahinmi aboard the main roster from France; signed Keith Bogans and Antonio McDyess). The Spurs kept only Parker, Ginobili, Duncan, Hill, and Bonner from last year's rotation. Out went the aging Finley, Bowen, Oberto, and Thomas; younger legs including Blair, Jefferson, and Bogans (plus the admittedly mature McDyess) supplanted them. As of this writing, they lead Dallas 3-2 in their first-round playoff series. Last year Dallas won the series in five games, so at the least the Spurs have improved.

Dallas's Donnie Nelson (drafted Rodrigue Beaubois; signed Drew Gooden and Tim Thomas; traded Jerry Stackhouse/Devean George/Antoine Wright for Shawn Marion/Kris Humphries/Greg Buckner; traded Humphries/Shawne Williams for Eduardo Najera; traded Josh Howard/Gooden/James Singleton/Quentin Ross for Caron Butler/Brendan Haywood/Deshawn Stevenson). Some of the Mavs' moves seem akin to a "Flip This House" strategy, as the above transaction list clearly includes the acquisition and then abrumpt dismissal of players including Gooden and Humphries. Still, it is hard to argue against the point that they have improved their roster. Caron Butler and Shawn Marion are former All-Stars, and Brendan Haywood is an above-average defensive center. Even ignoring all the trades, they came up with a brilliant late-first-round pick by nabbing Beaubois, who has shown enticing flashes of preternatural ability.

Milwaukee's John Hammond (drafted Brandon Jennings; signed Ersan Ilyasova; traded Richard Jefferson for Kurt Thomas/Bruce Bowen/Amir Johnson; traded Amir Johnson/Sonny Weems for Roko Ukic/Carlos Delfino; traded Joe Alexander/Hakim Warrick for John Salmons; signed Jerry Stackhouse). Jennings, Ilyasova, Delfino, Salmons, and Stackhouse are now all contributing to the Bucks' playoff success. Jefferson, who starred for many years in New Jersey, disappointed in his one year in Milwaukee and is not playing much better in San Antonio; meanwhile, Kurt Thomas has played 70 games for the Bucks and contributes 4 rebounds per game from a bench position. Bowen retired and represented saved money for Milwaukee.

Orlando's Otis Smith (traded Courtney Lee and Rafer Alston for Ryan Anderson and Vince Carter; signed Matt Barnes, Jason Williams, and Brandon Bass; re-signed Marcin Gortat). Orlando made the Finals last year, and now they're even better. They are clearly the deepest team in the league. If Jameer Nelson goes down, you've got El Chocolate Blanco or Anthony Johnson. In the "bigs" rotation, you have Dwight Howard, Bass, Anderson, Gortat, Rashard Lewis, and even Adonal Foyle. Perimeter players include Carter, Barnes, mainstay J.J. Redick, and Mickael Pietrus. Nearly every guy save Bass, Gortat, Foyle, and of course Howard can easily stroke 3-pointers. The new players are clearly an upgrade on the departed Lee, Alston, Tony Battie, and Hedo Turkoglu. None of the latter four players played as well in 2009-10 as they had with Orlando.

Houston's Daryl Morey (drafted Chase Budinger; signed Trevor Ariza; traded Carl Landry and Tracy McGrady for Jordan Hill, Jared Jeffries, Kevin Martin, and draft picks). Morey's team has not appreciably improved since they came within one game of the Western Conference Finals nearly 12 months ago. The continued deterioration of Tracy McGrady and Yao Ming's chronic foot problems means that the dominant inside-outside combination that team leaders happily imagined back in 2004 will never obtain. Houston missed the playoffs this season; however, with all of the new assets in Houston, the Rox may be ready to implement a trade that will bring a star like LeBron James or Chris Bosh to lower Texas.

New York's Donnie Walsh (drafted Jordan Hill and Toney Douglas; traded Quentin Richardson for Darko Milicic; re-signed David Lee for one year; signed Earl Barron and Jonathan Bender; traded Jordan Hill, Jared Jeffries, and draft picks for Tracy McGrady; traded Milicic for Brian Cardinal). The incoming talent in these deals has not been above average. The purpose of the McGrady trade was to remove Jared Jeffries from New York's 2010-11 salary roll in order to clear salary room for a big free agent. Of course, if Isiah Thomas had not signed Jeffries to such a long contract, such a movie would not have been necessary. For Thomas's folly, the Knicks lost two future draft picks. But at least Walsh has put the Knicks in a position to potentially lure in James and Bosh. As this article makes clear, Walsh has a pretty good plan for the free-agent signing period this summer.

Charlotte's Michael Jordan (drafted Gerald Henderson Jr.; traded Emeka Okafor to New Orleans for Tyson Chandler; signed Ronald "Flip" Murray; re-signed Raymond Felton to a one-year qualifying offer; traded Raja Bell and Vlad Radmanovic for Stephen Jackson and Acie Law; traded Law, Murray, and a draft pick for Tyrus Thomas; traded a future draft pick for Theo Ratliff). To me this one is simple. The Bobcats never made the playoffs before this season. Okafor was not defensively lithe enough to gain any purchase with Dwight Howard, say. Additionally, Okafor's contract extends to June 2014, too long for a team with parlous finances. With Jackson, Chandler, and Tyrus Thomas, the Bobcats escaped the lottery.

GOOD General Managers:

Sacramento's Geoff Petrie (drafted Tyreke Evans and Omri Casspi; traded draft rights to Jeff Pendergraph for Sergio Rodriguez and draft rights to Jon Brockman; signed Sean May and Ime Udoka; traded Kevin Martin and Sergio Rodriguez for Carl Landry and Joey Dorsey). Petrie's rookies turned out great, as Evans won the ROY award, Casspi earned starter minutes with his high energy and accurate shooting, and Brockman delivered several double-digit rebounding games. I think we do not yet know enough to evaluate the Landry trade. Martin and Evans probably could not co-exist together, as Evans is not a good enough distributor to deliver the ball to Martin in prime shooting positions. Landry has completed only three pro seasons and still has time to blossom as a top-caliber PF. With a plum lottery pick upcoming, Sacramento has positioned its roster to hotly succeed in the medium term.

Chicago's John Paxson (drafted Taj Gibson; decided to let Ben Gordon sign with Detroit; traded John Salmons for Warrick and Alexander; traded Tyrus Thomas for Acie Law and Flip Murray). Like New York's Donnie Walsh, the Bulls did not make a great deal of basketball progress, losing in the first round for the second consecutive year. Taj Gibson was a very good selection at the 26th position in the first-round. (One must consider that such draft pick was acquired in February 2009 via the Bulls' trading Thabo Sefolosha, who has blossomed into a very good defender with Oklahoma City. However, in this blog post we are evaluating only 2009-10 roster moves.) Derrick Rose and Joakim Noah, the team's two best players, certainly improved to a near-All-Star level during '09-'10. The roster moves entailed the loss of some good players, with resulting 2010-11 salary room to sign even better players. We do not know whether the best of 2003's class will choose to join Chicago, but the team is positioned well.

Atlanta's Rick Sund (traded Acie Law and Speedy Claxton to Golden State for Jamal Crawford; drafted Jeff Teague; signed Joe Smith and Jason Collins). The Hawks did not fiddle much with the roster that was readily swept by Cleveland in the 2009 conference semis. Acquiring Crawford, named Sixth Man of the Year just a couple days prior, added a valuable offensive dimension to the team. However, in light of Atlanta's easy destruction in last year's playoffs, a more significant roster upgrade would have been nice. Smith and Collins have hardly played.

L.A. Clippers's Mike Dunleavy (drafted Blake Griffin; traded Zach Randolph to Memphis for Quentin Richardson; traded Q-Rich to Minnesota for Craig Smith and Sebastian Telfair; traded a draft pick to New Orleans for Rasual Butler; traded Marcus Camby for Steve Blake and Travis Outlaw; traded Telfair and Al Thornton for Drew Gooden in a four-team trade). Drafting Griffin was an obvious choice at #1, and Dunleavy did a good job jettisoning Randolph to make room for Griffin in the starting lineup. (Unfortunately, Griffin then suffered a season-ending injury in training camp. Trading Camby was wise, as the Clips have Chris Kaman and young DeAndre Jordan in the middle position. Though Camby will be a 2010 free agent, the Bird rights to Blake and Outlaw might be useful to the Clips.

Portland's Kevin Pritchard (traded Sergio Rodriguez to Sacramento for a draft pick; drafted Jeff Pendergraph, Dante Cunningham, Victor Claver, and Patrick Mills; signed Andre Miller; granted contract extensions to LaMarcus Aldridge and Brandon Roy; traded Steve Blake and Travis Outlaw to the Clippers, as noted above, for Marcus Camby; signed Marcus Camby to a two-year contract extension). With a winning and youthful core of Roy, Aldridge, Nicolas Batum, and Greg Oden, the acquisition of so many rookies was somewhat strange; at the time, more veterans like Miller would have been more useful. Then, when Oden was later injured, the Camby trade was a good way to salvage the season, preserving a nontrivial possibility of a serious playoff run. Signing Camby before the summer free-agent frenzy was a smart move.

Oklahoma City's Sam Presti (drafted James Harden and Byron Mullens; traded Chucky Atkins and Damien Wilkins for Etan Thomas and draft picks; traded rights to a European player for Eric Maynor and the injured Matt Harpring). These were good, safe movies, though Oklahoma could have done more to ready their team for a Bosh or Boozer. James Harden at #3 in the draft looks questionable now: why not a better shooter like Stephen Curry? Harden has a couple more inches, enabling him to better defend other SGs, but Curry shoots like a Swedish biathon champion.

Denver's Mark Warkentien (drafted Ty Lawson; re-signed Chris Andersen; signed Joey Graham; traded a draft pick to Detroit for Walter Sharpe and Arron Afflalo; traded Sharpe and Sonny Weems to Milwaukee for Malik Allen; traded Steven Hunter and a draft pick for Dominique Jones). Denver allowed free agents Dahntay Jones and Linas Kleiza to sign elsewhere (the latter, in Greece) Afflalo blossomed in this, his third season, filling the defensive role that Jones occupied in 2008-09. Additionally, Afflalo developed a fine three-point shooting touch and some playmaking ability. After the regular season started, the Nuggets played things chill and easy, not making any roster transactions until a couple minor signings in April to gird for the playoffs. (Unfortunately, Denver quickly lost to Utah, lost without Coach Karl.) Lawson and Afflalo are excellent building blocks for the future, and Warkentien, who won Executive of the Year in 2008-09, must get credit for that.

New Orleans's Jeff Bower (drafted Darren Collison and Marcus Thornton; traded Tyson Chandler to Charlotte for Emeka Okafor; traded Rasual Butler to the Clippers for a draft pick; traded Antonio Daniels to Minnesota for Darius Songaila and Bobby Brown; signed Ike Diogu; traded Hilton Armstrong for a draft pick; traded Devin Brown for Aaron Gray; traded Bobby Brown for a draft pick). A lot of bench-caliber players entered and exited this roster. (Free agents Jannero Pargo and Ryan Bowen also left in the summer of 2009.) Collison and Thornton were very good draft picks late in the selection process; with Chris Paul injured for most of the season, those two young guards showed that they could lead the team and/or score like a piano composer. Okafor, as noted above, has a much longer contract but lacks Chandler's injury profile, and appears an adequate replacement.

OK General Managers

Phoenix's Steve Kerr (traded Shaquille O'Neal for Sasha Pavlovic and Ben Wallace; signed Channing Frye; chose not to trade Amare Stoudemire). Phoenix did not shuffle the roster much, aside from divesting Shaq. The Suns subsequently bought out the contracts of Pavlovic and Wallace. Phoenix largely did not mess with its roster after the 2008-09 season ended; some discussion of trading Amare Stoudemire before the February '10 trade deadline led to nothing. Phoenix's bench of Lopez/Barbosa/Dudley/Amundsen/Dragic has almost uniformly improved since last season, and their stalwart starters of Nash/Stoudemire/Richardson/Hill have not lost much despite their age. Channing Frye, like many other offensive-oriented players, thrived next to Steve Nash. The Suns are back in the playoffs, showing that Kerr was effective in his restraint.

Memphis's Chris Wallace (traded Darko Milicic for Quentin Richardson; traded Richardson for Zach Randolph; drafted Hasheem Thabeet and Sam Young; traded a draft pick for Ronnie Brewer; signed Jamaal Tinsley). Drafting Hasheem Thabeet at #2 was a terrible idea, when he could have nabbed Harden, Evans, Rubio, Flynn, Curry, Jennings, or Lawson. Flipping Milicic for Zach Randolph worked well, and the acquisition of Brewer showed good foresight (though he quickly suffered a season-ending injury). With Randolph, Memphis came close to its first playoff season since 2006. Still, Hasheem Thabeet?

Boston's Danny Ainge (signed Rasheed Wallace, Shelden Williams, Marquis Daniels, and Michael Finley; re-signed Glen Davis; signed Rajon Rondo to a contract extension; traded Bill Walker and J.R. Giddens for Nate Robinson). Rondo's extension was wise, as too many teams had 2010-11 salary room and would likely throw lush money at Rondo were he to be a free agent in July '10. Most of Boston's new bench players -- Williams, Daniels, and Finley -- were injured all season and contributed little. Wallace was nominally healthy, though mostly out of shape. The Celtics have not yet returned to their championship form of 2008. If Ainge wants to prolong the Celtics' current stretch of excellence, he will need to work harder in the coming summer.

Meanwhile, the WORST GENERAL MANAGER list must surely include:

Detroit's Joe Dumars (drafted Jonas Jerebko; signed Ben Wallace, Chris Wilcox, Ben Gordon, and Charlie Villanueva). Jerebko is a nice player, but Gordon and Villanueva are badly overpaid. Surely Detroit could have done better by waiting until 2010 to commit to long-term contracts.

New Jersey's Rod Thorn (drafted Terrence Williams; traded Vince Carter and Ryan Anderson for Courtney Lee, Rafer Alston, and Tony Battie). Williams is known to be headstrong and difficult to deal with. Vince Carter is an All-NBA-caliber talent who is surely worth much more than a one-year pseudo-veteran like Courtney Lee.

Toronto's Bryan Colangelo (traded Kris Humphries and Shawn Marion for Hedo Turkoglu, Devean George, and Antoine Wright; drafted Demar DeRozan; signed Jarrett Jack; traded George to Golden State for Marco Belinelli; signed Rasho Nesterovic; traded Delfino and Ukic to Milwaukee for Johnson and Weems). Turkoglu played like dirt; meanwhile, Marion helped Dallas remain at the top of any list. DeRozan has no obviously outstanding basketball skill, while the player taken at #10 in the draft immediately after DeRozan, Brandon Jennings, challenged for Rookie of the Year. Most importantly, Colangelo did little to convince Chris Bosh that the team is headed toward championship contention anytime soon. Why should he stay?

Minnesota's David Kahn (drafted Ricky Rubio, Jonny Flynn, and Wayne Ellington; signed Ramon Sessions; traded Brian Cardinal to the Knicks for Darko Milicic). The signing of Sessions was strange when Flynn was already anointed as the new starting point guard and Rubio, also a 1, is expected to join the team in 2011. Why did Sessions deserve a four-year contract? And if Flynn is good enough to pilot the team to the playoffs, why spend a high draft pick on Rubio? The trade market is hardly liquid; Rubio may not be flippable for a player of equal talent. And why is Darko Milicic worth any sort of speculative investment?

Utah's Kevin O'Connor`(drafted Eric Maynor; signed Wesley Matthews as undrafted rookie; traded Maynor and Matt Harpring to the Thunder for a European player's draft rights; traded Ronnie Brewer to Memphis for a first-round draft pick). The Matthews signing was excellent, but as an undrafted player, and soon to be a free agent again, he is likely to attract salary offers beyond the ken of Jazz ownership. Trading away Maynor and Brewer for nothing was inexplicable. (Harpring's contract was already covered by an insurer, due to the player's career-ending injuries.)