Be Careful What You Wish For

Across the league, the new new thing in roster management is clearing salary obligations from the 2010-11 rolls in order to free up more capacity for signing superstar free agents. To wit:

The Chicago Bulls are reportedly set to trade Kirk Hinrich to Washington.

Meanwhile, Miami traded Daequan Cook yesterday, and today are trying to rid themselves of SF James Jones's contract.

We know how New York traded away Jared Jeffries and Jordan Hill in February.

New Jersey traded away Vince Carter last year and, just yesterday, Chris Douglas-Roberts.

All these teams are shedding guys who could be, or have been, productive contributors to a playoff team.

All these teams are hoping to land two or three of the top free agents in July: LeBron James, Dwyane Wade, Chris Bosh, Joe Johnson, Amare Stoudemire, Carlos Boozer, David Lee, Rudy Gay, Dirk Nowitzki, Ray Allen. (Steve Nash, Manu Ginobili, and Kobe Bryant already re-signed with their existing squads, removing some intrigue from the coming Julian dog days.)

Unfortunately, there is a good chance that at least one team will look back and found that it divested assets for nothing. What if James stays with Cleveland, Cleveland trades for Stoudemire, Boozer joins the Nets, Wade and Bosh sign with Miami, Lee and Johnson sign with the Knicks, and Gay/Nowitzki/Allen stay where they are. The Bulls would then be bereft of talent, with only Rose/Noah/Deng/Gibson/Johnson signed for next season. The second-tier selection of free agents is unlikely to net a big-time performer: Luis Scola or John Salmons (who was a Bull just four months ago) could help, but they will hardly help the team hang with the Lakers. Tracy McGrady was once great, but probably little more than a Vinnie Johnson now.

Alternatively, I could construct a scenario where the Knicks, or Heat, or Nets lose this derby. Fans will wonder: "Wait, all those years of suffering through mediocrity yielded absolutely nothing?"

Moreover, not only is it risky to part ways with a perfectly serviceable player based on a highly uncertain hope of upgrading, but hanging on to the player might be a higher-probability play if you hope to snare LeBron. Due to rules in Article IX of the NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, a free agent can make more money annually, and gain an extra (sixth) guaranteed year of salary, by signing with his own team, rather than joining a new one. Thus, Chicago or Miami might have a better shot at acquiring Chris Bosh, say, by including Daequan Cook or Kirk Hinrich in a "sign-and-trade" where Bosh technically re-signs with Toronto to garner that extra booty. The Raptors might prefer such an outcome, too, as they would gain some value for their lost star. Having dumped Hinrich, the Bulls no longer have that strategic option.

So many teams have expressly committed to a strategy of readying for LeBron that the bold move might entail not doing so. I respect the Timberwolves and Thunder, which have good young players and salary space for a star, but have said virtually nothing about signing a top free agent. At least they evince a belief that their own budding stars are good enough. (Why should we think that Bosh, Johnson, Boozer, Stoudemire, Lee, or Gay are any better? None of them has led a team to the NBA Finals.)

A further irony is that the Bulls are casting off Hinrich, a tough point guard who has completed seven seasons in Chicago, to make way for Wade or Bosh or James. Let us recall that the ex-Jayhawk, like those celebrated others, is a member of the 2003 draft lottery class. And unlike the other free agents save Wade and Boozer, Hinrich made the Final Four!

The NBA Draft, A Locus of Radical Egalitarianism

Tomorrow night brings the NBA Draft, an annual allocation of employees to employers that, unlike most spheres of American life, puts fairness above efficiency. Were the draft solely concerned with maximizing happiness produced, it would survey each player on his ranking of preferred teams, then survey each team on its ranking of preferred players, and allocate them so as to maximize total satisfaction of players and teams. The richest teams would pay the most and the best players would earn ghastly sums. But the draft emphasizes equity in two ways: First, the worst teams get the best young players, helping them to improve. Second, salaries of rookies are strictly regulated, so that the #1 pick makes only one order of magnitude more money than a second-rounder (in contrast to the real world, where some not-particularly-skilled 22-year-olds can make six figures but many these days are unemployed).

In any case, the draft reminds me of the exodus that my college classmates made away from our cloistered university life into the "real" world many years ago. Some struck an ironic pose, treating work disdainfully, and imagining themselves still hip bohemian students. Some dove delightedly (sometimes disturbingly so) into the new institutions they joined, concentrating on ingratiating themselves with the movers and shakers they met. Some picked entirely new directions to take their life, but some continued on a dogged track that they had chosen at age 12 or so.

In any case, back on graduation day, every one of us had potential. Armed with the same diploma and the freedom to exercise our gumption, each person had enormous opportunities. Some soared high, some motored sturdily, some coasted, and a small number, unfortunately, stalled out. Years later, the correspondence of actual achievement to then-felt-goals is a fairly tight correlation, but there are a few anomalies here and there. Stuff happens to divert aspirations or steal away resources; perhaps someone realizes that crazy hard work really isn't worth it. But on the day we donned the same flat-capped uniform and left school, we were like NBA draftees, hopeful and equally-positioned.

Of course, some NBA picks "pan out" but some become "busts". For example, many of the "next Jordans" who showed up on the scene in the mid-to-late '90s are now washed up, or out of the league, due to injuries. Consider:

Stephon Marbury (drafted 1996)

Penny Hardaway (drafted 1993)

Steve Francis (drafted 1999)

Tracy McGrady (drafted 1997)

Michael Finley (drafted 1995)

Jerry Stackhouse (drafted 1995)

Grant Hill (drafted 1994)

Of the Next MJs of 10-15 years ago, only Paul Pierce, Vince Carter, & (especially) Kobe Bryant continue to perform at All-Star level. Many of the above-bulleted guys succumbed to injuries not of their fault, or received poor medical treatment that made the injuries worse than necessary. But many are now sapped and aged because they failed to work on developing their bodies, and now have no "hops" or "quicks" left. Marbury is already playing in China, and Francis has intimated he may go there soon.

The annual draft is a wonderful time, for we have the creative agency to imagine these players blossoming or falling in so many sundry ways. And why not? Evan Turner might be a jerk. Greg Monroe might be the next Sabonis. James Anderson could be the finest jump-shooter in the league, while Patrick Patterson could tear something. Apres moi, I appreciate the draft because it takes me back to an innocent day when I was 22 and had not yet made the choices that would lead to more choices.

Kupchak Delivered These Titles

So the Los Angeles Lakers have won the 2010 NBA championship with a narrow Game 7 victory over Boston.

Of everyone in the Lakers' organization, the most underrated contributor to their recent run of success must be General Manager Mitch Kupchak, who is very, very good at his job. At the least, he should be deemed the Executive of the Half-Decade.

Trading Shaquille O'Neal in 2004 was wise, as it jump-started the inevitably required rebuilding of the erstwhile three-time titlists. The Lakers could have squeezed maybe a couple more title-contending years out of the Kobe-Shaq duo in 2005 and 2006, but O'Neal was growing increasingly contentious and unmotivated in L.A., on top of his natural aging process.

In that same summer, Kupchak elected not to re-sign Derek Fisher, as his gritty services would not be needed on a re-building team. Kupchak also traded Gary Payton and Rick Fox (likewise not needed) for Chris Mihm, a center who could replace O'Neal's services in the short term. The same trade also netted Chucky Atkins and Marcus Banks, young 1s who could replace the point guarding offered by Payton and Fisher. Atkins started every game of the 2004-05 season for Los Angeles, delivering a steady 14 PPG.

Lamar Odom, obtained from Miami in the O’Neal trade, was a good piece for a future title contender. Certainly not the second-best player on a champion, but as we have actually seen, he is an extremely valuable contributor.

One year later, in summer 2005, Kupchak realized he needed to gamble on some young big men with high upside; thus, he drafted Andrew Bynum and traded Caron Butler for Kwame Brown. Helped by tutoring from Kareem Abdul-Jabbar. Bynum developed into a championship-quality starting center (though he is injury-prone). Brown never improved much, though the Lakers were able to flip him (with a couple rookies and draft picks) for Pau Gasol halfway through the 2007-08 season.

Thus, the Lakers’ top 4 of Bryant, Gasol, Bynum, and Odom were set in February 2008. However, prior to that season, back in the summer of ’07, many pundits, and Kobe Bryant himself, questioned Kupchak’s long-term plan for returning the team to the top of the league, after three seasons without a playoff series win. “Ship his ass out!” Bryant pleaded ironically (referring to Bynum, in a putative trade for Jason Kidd) while kibitzing with two random dudes in a parking lot, as though Bryant himself were just a beer-bellied couch potato with opinions on everything hoopish.

In the 7 months following that incident, Kupchak refrained from the impulse to grant Bryant's trade request, then signed Derek Fisher, acquired Trevor Ariza by trade, then acquired Gasol in the 2008 trade that Gregg Popovich termed "beyond comprehension" for its one-sidedness.

Kupchak also proved a good drafter, taking Luke Walton in 2003, Sasha Vujacic in 2004, Bynum in 2005, and Jordan Farmar in 2006. All played meaningful minutes in the 2009 and 2010 Finals.

Finally, Kupchak has looked for only the highest caliber of coach. In 2004 he signed two-time championship coach Rudy Tomjanovich, and when he resigned in 2005 for personal reasons, Kupchak re-signed nine-time titlist Phil Jackson. Jackson may retire this summer, and if that happens, Kupchak would be wise to sign Byron Scott, former three-time champ as a player, two-time Finalist as a coach, and 2008 Coach of the Year.

Fisher and Farmar will be free agents come July and may not return; the Lakers may need to find a higher-caliber point guard. But with all the above-mentioned players, plus 2009 free agent acquisition Ron Artest, the Lakers seem poised to win at least one more title in the next three seasons, before the contracts and health of their top guys begin to expire. Kupchak has shown a golden touch since Shaquille O'Neal left. The challenge will be to find the next generation of Laker superstars when Bryant and Gasol eventually retire.

Should Floppers Get a Tech?

Basketball fans watching the World Cup over the past couple days may have noted that FIFA gives yellow cards to a player who egregiously flops, acting as though his opponent knocked him down, in hopes of drawing a call against his counterpart for supposed unsportsmanlike conduct. Such diving is euphemistically called** "simulation" in the official FIFA argot. A yellow card in soccer is quite like a technical foul in the NBA; two yellow cards result in a red card, which means the player in question is ejected. The footballing penalty is actually more severe than two techs in a basketball game; in the former, the player's team is forced to play with ten men for the duration of the game, while in the latter, the player's team simply replaces the banished player. On the other hand, a technical foul in basketball results in one free throw for the opposing team, usually an easy point with a skilled shooter. All told, a yellow card is probably more serious than a technical foul. One point is highly unlikely to alter the tenor of a basketball game, while playing one man down in soccer probably means you will give up a goal.

Under current NBA rules, of course, there is no penalty to players who blatantly take a dive; Derek Fisher can flop all he wants and live to see another Rondo. And some pundits have argued that flopping has become a greater problem in the NBA in the last ten years as more European and South American players, influenced by soccer culture, have entered the league. Should the impunity around flopping be changed?

We might do well to consider the direct costs of flopping, aside from referee-imposed penalties. In basketball, a defensive flop can give your opponent an easy path to the basket for two quick points, if no foul is called. The enormous size of a soccer pitch, and the number of players on the field, means that a flop by one individual player is unlikely to result in a clear advantage for the other side. So perhaps the risk of an unsuccessful flop (i.e. a flop that fails to draw a foul) provides sufficient caution against would-be basketball floppers. Plus, crashing to the hardwood can hurt weary bones; a trip to the green lawn is far softer.

The biggest problem with penalizing flopping in basketball is the subjective discretion that this would invest in referees. If a player drops, was it a dive, or was he pushed? It would be difficult to definitively demarcate the difference in any written set of rules. Soccer referees indeed do have this discretion, but upper-body contact is less common in that sport and a flop is likely easier to identify as such.

All told, I do not support the penalizing of flopping in the NBA at this time. However, referees must become more chary about calling a foul to reward the player who flopped. If a non-American player (or Derek Fisher) dives unexpectedly, it was probably fake.

**[Warning, large PDF; see page 115]

KG Deserved Better

Nearly three years after Kevin Garnett joined the Celtics, I still find it difficult to watch this short promotional spot and not feel a tear fighting its way through my ducts.

However, beyond the emotional wallop, what are we to make of this video? If, as seems apparent from the branding, the NBA and not the Celtics is the voice behind this advertisement — and thus, if NBA fans en masse, rather than Celtics fans, are the target audience — exactly what value proposition is the league trying to sell me on? Is the league telling me that, as a putative fan of any randomly-selected team, I have hope that a superstar may one day come to my team by trade? Well, that's not credible; in recent years, the big trades of MVP-caliber players have involved Jason Kidd to New Jersey, Shaq to Miami, McGrady to Houston, Garnett to Boston, and Pau Gasol to the Lakers. In other words, talented teams in big cities picked up more talent. A Memphis or Milwaukee fan sees little inspiration from this set of facts.

On the other hand, perhaps the message is "If you follow a highly talented player, rest assured that he will eventually find his way to a winning team." This has generally proved true over the years: Besides the examples above, Bob McAdoo joined the Lakers, Charles Barkley joined Phoenix, and Chris Bosh seems poised to join a contender next month. However, this argument collapses of its own weight. The NBA markets stars. Unlike the other major team sports in the United States, the NBA's players wear no headgear shrouding their features. Jersey sales, ticket prices, and TV ratings are generally driven by the appearance of great players in attractive situations. Dwyane Wade seems far more exciting when flanked by Shaquille O'Neal and Gary Payton than he did in the past couple seasons, when he led Joel Anthony and Mario Chalmers into opposing arenas. The Garnett ad above implicitly admits that the Association failed, for 11 of his 12 Timberwolf seasons (excluding the highly successful 2003-04 Minnesota campaign featuring Cassell, Sprewell, Szczerbiak, though even then the team's aggregate talent was middling), to put Garnett into a situation where he could thrive. Should we now applaud the league for giving us a product that includes Garnett as a winner? That is like thanking BP for cleaning up their oil spill.

And this brings me to the upcoming free-agent signing season. For months and possibly years, fans of mediocre teams such as Chicago, New York, Miami, Oklahoma City [though they have moved past "mediocre" now] Sacramento, Minnesota, Washington and the LA Clippers have anticipated July 2010 as a chance to upgrade their roster's core identity in a single swoop, like Dennis Quaid changing his face in Innerspace. But what if none of the top free agents move? It is conceivable that James, Wade, Nowitzki, Johnson, Stoudemire, Boozer, Lee, Gay, Allen, and McGrady could all remain with their current teams. Already, possible free agents Nash, Bryant, and Ginobili re-signed with their teams before their contracts expired. The only near-certainty seems to be Chris Bosh leaving Toronto. If this stagnancy happens, for many fans it would be a lump of coal at the bottom of a brightly adorned Christmas stocking hung on the chimney with care.

Finals Home-Road Format Is Close To Irrelevant

In last night's Game 1 between Los Angeles and Boston, ESPN/ABC's Jeff Van Gundy proposed changing the NBA Finals format from 2-3-2 (two home games for Team A, three home games for Team B, two home games for Team A) to a 2-2-1-1-1 format, which is used in all preceding playoff series. There are good reasons for the existing scheme: The 2-3-2 format requires only two inter-city journeys rather than, potentially, four. When East meets West, inter-city travel is generally further than in the intra-conference playoffs, and there are also many more journalists covering the NBA Finals compared to earlier rounds, so the airfare costs and hassle of 2-2-1-1-1 could be enormous. So the NBA's logic is patent.

But what of Van Gundy's claim? He seemed to argue that it is difficult for the team with the middle three home games to win all three and thereby fully exercise its home-court entitlement. But under his scheme, Team B would get a home date for Game 3, Game 4, and Game 6. Why should we think that the probability of winning Games 3, 4, & 6 at home (after a Game 5 on the road) is higher than the probability of winning Games 3, 4, & 5 consecutively? To be sure, few Team Bs in the last couple decades — only Detroit in 2004 and Miami in 2006 — have won the middle three games at home. But the sample size is low: only 20 series in those two decades. How many teams, in tightly-contested series (thus, consider only the conference finals) have won games 3, 4, & 6 at home? I doubt much more than four in the last 40 conference final series.


What's more, from the perspective of Team B, the 2-3-2 format is more forgiving. Assume Team B has a 2/3 chance of winning any given home game, and assume each game result is independent of other games. Assume further that Team A is 99% dominant at home and already won both of Game 1 and 2 on Team A's floor. If you win two of your three middle home games (probability = 12/27, or 44%), or all three of your middle home games (probability = 8/27, or 30%) then you can extend the series to at least Game 6 and make a respectable showing. (Thus, your chance of getting to Game 6 is 74%.) In a 2-2-1-1-1 format, unless Team B wins both of Game 3 and Game 4 at home (probability = 4/9, or 44%) , then Team A can finish off the series in its arena in Game 5. Given this disparity in likelihood, why not take the comfort of the 2-3-2 format?

Now, the dominant Team A might not like this, but they're going to win the series anyway, and lengthening the series means more ad revenue for everyone, so what's the harm?

Lakers in 5

My prediction could not be more clear. The Celtics are good, but several of their players (Rondo, Perkins, Garnett, T.Allen, Wallace, Daniels) are in various stages of recovery from injury, and Perkins risks suspension every time he tussles in the paint. Kobe Bryant is supposedly suffering from various ailments, but his performance in the Utah series and Phoenix series resembled Michael Jordan in a way I've never seen from any other player. Andrew Bynum can only give about 20 minutes per game due to a knee injury, but he does better when playing without Pau Gasol on the floor, anyway.

Who on the Celtics will score the ball? Perkins cannot score with his wrist injury; he has averaged 5.6 points in the postseason, down from 10.1 in the regular. Moreover, Bynum/Gasol can surely contain a reduced Garnett. Artest will do a much better job containing Paul Pierce than Vladimir Radmanovic or Lamar Odom could in 2008. Rajon Rondo has obviously improved greatly since two years ago, and he will likely carve up the Lakers' parade of inferior defenders: Fisher, Farmar, Vujacic, Brown. However, if Rondo is scoring, he is not distributing, and his teammates may grow frustrated. It may fall to the Celtics' reserves — Davis, Wallace, and Nate Rob — to spark Boston's offensive flow.

Boston can still play excellent D, but Los Angeles now has Bynum and Artest as additional offensive options compared to their '08 squad. It is hard to imagine Ray Allen containing Kobe Bryant's endless array of feints and parries, even if Bryant tires somewhat chasing Allen around curl patterns at the other end.

The Lakers have grown fat and happy since 2008, as Lamar Odom, Sasha Vujacic, and even Andrew Bynum have found some measure of womanly companionship. However, the stern bark of Kobe Bryant will keep them focused on the prize. Boston is very good, but the Lakers are better.

Why Two For One?

A few weeks ago we addressed the somewhat specious platitude that finishing a quarter strongly is particularly important. We neglected, though, to address another end-of-quarter oddity. When a team takes possession of the ball with, say, between 48 and 35 seconds remaining in a quarter (save the fourth), coaches sometimes advise their charges to quickly put up a shot so that the opposing team gets it with no less than, say, 30 seconds left. This way, the first team will get the ball back with no less than, say, 6 seconds left, and can try for one more shot. The strategy is called "Two For One". The idea is to get two possessions before the quarter ends.

There are a couple concerns here.

First, if the first team gives the second team the ball back with a bit more than 35 seconds left, then the second team can try its own Two-For-One strategy. Thus, the first team must manage its initial possession to make a shot quickly, but not too quickly.

Second, are two low-probability shots better than one high-probability possession? Assume a frenzied drive at the 0:40 mark, without first setting up holes in the defensive alignment, has a 30% chance of success, and then a desperate 3-point heave at the 0:03 mark has a 10% chance of success. By my calculation, the expected points scored there is 0.45. Meanwhile, your opponent gets a full shot clock to work a set play sandwiched between your two possessions; perhaps the opponent has a 45% chance of scoring, with expected points scored of 0.9. So your expected +/- for that Two-For-One sequence is -0.45. On the other hand, if you took possession at 0:40 and worked the shot clock to the fullest, you have a 0.45 chance of success, with expected points scored of 0.9. Your opponent takes possession at 0:16 and, with somewhat less time to work with, has only a 0.3 chance of scoring, with expected points scored of 0.6. Your expected +/- for that sequence is thus +0.3.

Obviously my mathematical assumptions can be tweaked to make the Two-For-One strategy seem a bit more favorable, but you get the idea.

Antoine Walker: Not A Bust, Now Bust

Antoine Walker, a former Boston Celtic, Dallas Maverick, Atlanta Hawk, Miami Heater, and Memphis Grizzly, apparently filed for bankruptcy last week under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The linked article from the Wall Street Journal does a good job of outlining Walker's financial woes: $12 MM in personal debts but only $4 MM in assets. Yeah, this guy lived a bit too large. He generally lived up to his promise as the #6 pick in the 1996 NBA draft, scoring over 20 PPG for five years and helping the Miami Heat win the 2006 NBA title as their starting small forward. Although he took a lot of foolhardy three-pointers, his biggest disappointment was in his financial prudence.

Under 11 U.S.C. §523 and §727, a Chapter 7 case results, after liquidation of the debtor's estate, in discharge of all the debtor's debts that arose before the bankruptcy petition (with certain exceptions like tax obligations and domestic support obligations). Secured creditors get the value of their collateral, up to the amount of their secured claim, and unsecured creditors get whatever is left over from such collateral and the debtor's other assets. Walker is going to wind up with nothing going forward, other than his income-generating ability, whatever that may be.

What's more, it seems that Walker's biggest real estate liability is a $2.3 MM secured mortgage on a Chicago-area mansion. Illinois allows deficiency judgments (see 735 ILCS §15-1504(f)), which means that even if Walker's mortgage lender foreclosed on his house under ordinary non-bankruptcy procedure, they could still sue him for the difference if the market value of the mansion came in below $2.3 MM, which is likely given recent real estate trends. In Chapter 7, that potential deficiency claim by the bank will be discharged along with most of his other personal debts. This would not be the case in a Chapter 13 filing.

Under 11 U.S.C. §707(b), Walker's Chapter 7 filing might be deemed presumptively abusive and thus dismissed, or converted to Chapters 11/13, if his monthly net income (after deducting reasonable living expenses, mortgage payments, and domestic support obligations), multiplied by 60, exceeds $10,000. In other words, if his monthly net income exceeds $167, his case may be deemed abusive, unless he can show "special circumstances" such as military service obligation or a serious medical condition. It is hard to believe that Walker cannot bank a couple hundred bucks per month, but I suppose that is what you get when you live like Antoine Walker. In the WSJ article above, he claims to have zero income.

David Stern's John Hancock

Why is the signature of NBA Commissioner "David J. Stern" emblazoned on every NBA game ball? This is like if the property manager of your mostly-rental apartment building decided to hang his portrait in every elevator.

Sure, Stern, like your building manager and the US President, has been hired to enforce rules and keep the house in good working order. But Stern is best thought of as a career bureaucrat, not a politician. He was not democratically elected by most of the stakeholders of the NBA, viz. players and fans. The owners hired him 26 years ago to enforce an arcane set of rules that they agreed upon. A loyal fonctionnaire, he is good at his job and doesn't feel like leaving. This could be contrasted with U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, who was appointed by a democratically-elected President and confirmed by a democratically-elected Senate. When I see Tim G's signature on my money, I know that he's the guy whom my representatives approved to manage the common fisc.

For this reason, my analogy might fall apart if you changed the hypothetical apartment building to mostly owner-occupied. In such case, the building manager could be seen as a truly democratically supported agent of the residents. In that case, I might not mind seeing his smiling mug as I stepped into the lift.

But I'm sorry, David Stern is not the face of the league. (That role can be inferred by looking at the guys who appear in NBA Cares ads: Nash, James, Bryant, Yao.) He has no popular accountability to anyone, save the 30 owners who control revenues and intangible assets of the league. And really, who cares about them?

Matchups Matter; Celtics Defy Elementary Logic

Consider the following facts:

1. The 2008 Atlanta Hawks played the 2008 Celtics to a near-draw, before falling in seven games.

2. The 2008 Celtics were superior to the 2010 Celtics, due to the ensuing two years of injury and aging for the team's Big Three. In the regular season, the former won 63 games and the latter won 50.

3. The 2008 Hawks were inferior to the 2010 Hawks, due to the ensuing two years of growth and development by the team's core young players: Williams, Smith, Horford, and Johnson. In the regular season, the former won 37 games and the latter won 53.

4. The 2010 Orlando Magic were vastly superior to the 2010 Atlanta Hawks, defeating the latter by an average of 23 points in a four-game sweep.

Thus, by inference, the 2010 Hawks should be better than the 2010 Celtics, and thus the 2010 Magic should be heaps better than the 2010 Celtics.

But the observed data shows that the Celtics have defeated Orlando twice on the latter's home floor, and now lead the series 3-1.

This oddity represents an example of the First Law of Playoff Basketball: Matchups matter. A fast team, Atlanta, can torment a relatively slow team, like the Celtics. The small, fast team may fall victim to a squad full of 7-foot redwood timber, such as Orlando, which can boast Gortat at center, Dwight Howard at PF, and Rashard Lewis at SF. Yet Orlando can succumb to Boston due to the latter's quick PG and stout defensive center.

In other words, superiority of teams is not transitive. A > B and B > C does not imply A > C. Over in the Western conference, the Lakers seem clearly superior to Phoenix, while the Suns broomed away San Antonio in four straight. Could the Lakers handle the Spurs so easily? The derring-do of Tony Parker and the offensive range of Tim Duncan and Antonio McDyess suggest otherwise.


This seems to upend our traditional interpretations of a single-elimination tournament, whether that be the NBA playoffs, the NCAA Division I men's basketball bracket, or Wimbledon. At any given stage of elimination, a still-extant team is ostensibly better than all losing teams in the sub-bracket whence it emerged. (In March Madness, a team that makes the Sweet 16 is (i) better than the team it beat in the first round, (ii) better than the team it beat in the second round, and (iii) by transitivity, better than the first-round-victim of the team it beat in the second round.) Following this logic to the end, the champion competitor is better than all losing teams in the tournament. But once transitivity fails, what are we left with? The champion just got lucky? The champion was just good at avoiding injuries, as we outlined here?

That winning requires, or is ordinarily correlated with, luck is somewhat disappointing; hallowed canards hold that the best teams will their way to a title. Recall Jordan's flu game or the Miami Heat refusing to lose against Dallas. Additionally, American society is premised on internecine competitions yielding one true great one. What is American Idol, if not a nod to the spelling bees that have challenged rural American children since the 19th century? Whereas spelling prowess and perhaps even singing ability can be measured and compared, team basketball success may be somewhat more ethereal.

I must credit my co-blogger H.O.S.S. for suggesting this idea.

Assessing The Playoffs Thus Far

After two games of the Western and Eastern conference finals, here is how I see it:

Best things about the playoffs thus far
1. Phoenix beats the Spurs finally
2. Celtics re-naissance
3. Thunder give legit challenge to Lakers

Worst things about the playoffs thus far:
1. Hawks underperform
2. 3 of 4 East first-round series are massacres
3. Conference finals have feeling of being a foregone conclusion

Fallacy of Enduring Franchise Traits

I'm tired of statistics showing the historical performance of teams in certain situations, spanning multiple decades. Take the following tidbit from an online Sports Illustrated article yesterday: "The Celtics ... are 32-0 in seven-game series in which they've taken a 2-0 lead."

That's simply not of interest to me. I might be interested in the historical performance of all teams in this situation (viz. teams that win the first two games of a series have a historical series win record of 217-14, 93%, and if we focus on teams that win the series's first two games on the road, they won 22 of 25 series, 88%), but why would the historical Celtics performance in this situation add any useful information? The Celtics as a Massachusetts corporate entity have some continuous legal life, and by convention, the current group of guys shares some virtual heritage with former teams called Celtics. Yet the 1959 Celtics of Russell and Cousy are no closer in composition to the 2010 Celtics compared to, say, the similitude of the 1979 Sonics to the current Celtics. There is little that has remained constant with the Celtics franchise over time, other than green uniforms and a stadium in downtown Boston. So why should we think that all-time Celtics statistics are informative for the current team's situation?

As Rick Pitino once put it, Larry Bird ain't walking through that door.

Celtics Fell Mighty Magic in Game 1

I was visiting Boston and communing with a fellow member of the JPO team yesterday, but due to the quirks of my travel schedule, I actually was not able to view most of the Orlando-Boston game and could only see highlights. The box score reveals a couple interesting quirks to me, though.

* Boston out-assisted Orlando, 21 to 10. Orlando had averaged nearly 19 assists per game in their first two post-season series. Look for Stan Van Gundy to emphasize more pick-and-roll action in Game 2, freeing up Vince Carter and Rashard Lewis for more easy shots.

* Relatedly, Orlando shot only 5 for 22 from three-point range, an unusually low clip compared to their regular-season percentage of 37%. Had they made a couple more of those, they could have nipped Boston.

Prior to this series, I told my co-bloggers that I predict Orlando in 6 games. I still stand by that prediction, although obviously my prediction now seems significantly less likely, both in a simple arithmetical sense and also due to what we learned about the teams' relative strengths.

If He Brons It, Will They Come?

Today's rumors center on LeBron James's next team, after Cleveland lost, surprisingly to some pundits, to the Boston Celtics in the second round. A cursory analysis suggests that, of the teams with room under the salary cap to sign a top free-agent player to a "max" contract, the Chicago Bulls are the most attractive, followed closely by the Nets and Clippers. This superiority arises from those teams' employment of talented young players under low-money rookie contracts — hence their low aggregate salary rolls. Chicago boasts several champions of the under-23 circuit, including Derrick Rose, Joakim Noah, and Taj Gibson, while New Jersey fields Courtney Lee, Terrence Williams, and Brook Lopez, and the Clips include Blake Griffin and Eric Gordon. (Each of those teams also has good veteran players, such as Kirk Hinrich, Devin Harris, and Chris Kaman.) New Jersey also finished with the league's worst record in 2009-10 and is assured of a draft pick somewhere in slots #1 through #4. The New York Knicks, meanwhile, have been trading away talented players like Zach Randolph, Jamal Crawford, Jordan Hill, and Jared Jeffries since 2008 in order to clear salary in order to sign two top 2010 free agents.

It would be a cruel blow to fans of other historically weak teams, particularly the Knicks, if the Bulls manage to grab LBJ. The Bulls have long been the fourth act in a sports-crazy town. In Jerry Sloan's playing days, the Bulls were a curious oddity who only won their division once.
Michael Jordan spoiled the city with six championships, though his arrival coincided with the "Monsters of the Midway" Bears championship team and the Cubs captaincy of Ryne Sandberg. Since Jordan left in 1998, the Bulls have returned to their fourth-class status. Yes, they routinely sell out their arena and have led the league in attendance for the past decade, but it is difficult to find any young person sporting a Luol Deng jersey on Michigan or Kedzie Avenues. Tailgating at Bears games or bratwursting at Cubs tilts is far more common.

Just to illustrate this disparity, I scored tickets to attend last month's Bulls-Cavs first-round series at $47 each (including all taxes and other ancillary charges). Lately I have been exploring attending the pending Blackhawks-Sharks NHL series; the cheapest seat will cost me $183! Even hockey, another country's national sport, beats basketball here in the home of Kevin Garnett and Dwyane Wade.

Signs have burgeoned recently suggesting that LeBron James may join the Bulls as a free agent this summer, perhaps with another top FA like Chris Bosh. What's more, now President Barack Obama has an opinion about Mr. James's next team! I support our President, but I feel he should leave this one to the professionals.

While basketball-mad Knicks fans have patiently waited through nine years of futility (the Knicks' last winning season was 2000-01) for this coming summer, Bulls fans generally have had little expectations. As I noted in this earlier post, the Bulls have not shown a single clear direction in the twelve years since Jordan pushed off. The Bulls lucked into the top pick of the 2008 draft though they ranked only ninth-worst in the regular-season standings. They subsequently hired the wrong coach, as I charged here. Even in the past couple years, as it became apparent that Joakim Noah and Derrick Rose are championship-caliber pros, few took seriously the notion that the Bulls could sign a star, until GM John Paxson quietly traded away John Salmons to the rampaging Bucks last February, clearing sufficient room off the Bulls' 2010-11 salary roll.

If Chicago is able to dominate the Teens of the NBA with the panache it showed in the Nineties, it would represent a rather plutocratic concentration of basketball success for a city that hardly craves it. Knicks fans deserve a fantastic team, but it may be Bears and Blackhawks fans who get it.

Finishing Arbitrary Divisions Of Game Time

TNT’s Doug Collins, whom we discussed yesterday, is fond of emphasizing the importance of finishing quarters strongly. To be sure, there may be a temptation to slacken effort when a break looms; that is not unusual in any professional setting. (Most government offices that I have seen feature "Friday afternoon happy hour" that starts around 2:00.) So sure, it is important to resist this temptation in the final two minutes of a game. On the other hand, a "finish strong" ethos common among athletes could result in increased, not reduced, effort towards the end of quarters. I am not sure which way the tendency cuts, overall. However, in any case, we should not regard developments in those segments of time as different from the rest of the game.

Score gains or score losses against your opponent in the first two minutes of a quarter count for just as much as gains/losses in the final two minutes of a quarter. The same can be said for the second two minutes, the third two minutes, the fourth two minutes, and the fifth two minutes. Towards the end of quarters, Collins often says things like: "The team now leading by 12 should be careful: if they don't play hard, that lead could be down to 4 by the end of the quarter." True, but the potential to allow a "run" of several baskets by your opponent exists at any time during the game. Is it worse if this happens at the end of a quarter? A basketball game consists of 48 minutes. Why is the point differential after the 12th, 24th, and 36th minute any more significant than the differential after the 5th, 19th, or 40th minute?

In one sense, the division of the game into four 12-minute blocks is arbitrary. Indeed, the rest time during TV breaks within quarters can be just as long as the rest time between quarters. Given that everyone psychologically regards quarters and halves as some heuristically convenient way to tote up partial performance, perhaps nebulous entities like motivation, confidence, strategic planning, and "momentum" are more affected by the score at the end of quarters compared to the score at any randomly selected moment within a quarter — hence Doug Collins's special concern. But surely a slam dunk "with no regard for human life!" or a dagger three-pointer to cap a run can energize a crowd and provoke some navel-gazing, even it occurs three minutes into the third.

It is a close call, but I do believe that Collins's concern with finishing quarters is overblown.

Doug Collins, Ace Reporter

Doug Collins, longtime color commentator for TNT, must be the Bob Woodward of NBA journalists. Whenever he broadcasts a Phoenix Suns game (or, prior to the 2007-08 season, whenever he did an Orlando tilt) he brings viewers useful bits of knowledge from his "insider source" Grant Hill. Apparently Hill is in the habit of sidling up to Collins's broadcast table during the game to kibbitz.

There are two reasons for this unusually close relationship. First, Collins's son, Chris Collins, was a teammate of Hill on the Duke University team in the early 1990s. Together, they almost won a third national championship for Duke in the 1994 NCAA tournament, falling eventually to Arkansas in front of a delighted President Clinton. The younger Collins remained so close to that college program that he returned as an assistant coach for Coach Krzyzewski in 2000, where he has remained for 10 years.

Second, the elder Collins coached Grant Hill on the Detroit Pistons during his finest years, 1995-96 through 1997-98. In '96-'97, the Pistons went 54-28 and Hill turned in an MVP-caliber season with 21 points, 9 rebounds, and 7 assists. Sadly, that was the pinnacle of Hill's career, as he never again won so many games until he joined 55-win Phoenix for 2007-08. With his devastating ankle injury in 2000, he was never again the same dynamic player, either.

It is little wonder that Hill, who as we pointed out here is the son of an athlete, can feel some affinity with Doug Collins, the father of an athlete, as a paternal figure.

Don't Mean A Thing If You Ain't Got That Ring

In the last 30 seasons, 1979-80 through 2008-09, only eight NBA teams have won championships. It is a stunning concentration of power, after eight different teams won championships in the 1970s. Perhaps star players are more durable today due to better training (and less drug abuse?)

Los Angeles (9)
Chicago (6)
San Antonio (4)
Boston (4)
Detroit (3)
Houston (2)
Philadelphia (1)
Miami (1)

If I had to bet, I would say that there will NOT be a new addition to this list after the 2010 NBA Finals.

From Draft Day to LOB Day

While watching San Antonio win its playoff series against Dallas last night, I noted that the Spurs have a whopping five players in their rotation whom they originally drafted: Duncan, Parker, Ginobili, Hill, and Blair. Other than Duncan (1997 #1), all the others were late first-round picks or second-round picks. They surely must have the best scouting department in the league.

By contrast, the Thunder, the NBA's youngest team, also have several regulars whom they drafted, but almost all in the lottery: Westbrook, Harden, Collison, Durant, Green, Ibaka. (Collison, as we noted in this 2008 post, has been with the Sonics/Thunder franchise since 2003.)

Upon some tallying, as shown below, it seems that most playoff teams, even those perceived as "young" or "up and coming", have just 4 or 5 rotation players whom they drafted. The team with the greatest number of original draftees in its rotation turns out to be Portland, with 7.

Building a winning team mainly with draft picks is difficult, as it requires predicting on-court chemistry before players enter their prime, and really before they've even met each other. If you get your draft picks "right", as Oklahoma City and Portland have, then you can quickly win while paying cheap rookie salaries. If you screw up your picks, as Charlotte has (D.J. Augustin over Brook Lopez? Gerald Henderson over Ty Lawson?) then your re-building project will fail and you will be doomed to start over a few years hence. Aside from Portland and the Thunder, there are few playoff teams that have "grown up" together from draft day to huge postseason success. Most successful teams require a significant trade or free-agent signing (think Bill Cartwright to the Bulls, Dennis Rodman to the Bulls, Pau Gasol to the Lakers, Mark Aguirre to the Pistons, Rashard Lewis to the Magic) before they can fully ascend.

(For purposes of this list below, "drafted" includes trading for a player's rights shortly after some other team drafted him, as happened with Gortat, Hilario, Fesenko, Fernandez. This also includes the signing of undrafted free agents, such as Chris Andersen, J.J. Barea, Wesley Matthews, Udonis Haslem. This includes players presently injured but ordinarily part of the rotation such as Oden, Redd, Kirilenko. Finally, I am generously including players on their second stop with their original team, including PGs such as Kidd, Nash, Fisher.)

DRAFTED PLAYERS IN PLAYOFF ROTATIONS WITH THEIR ORIGINAL TEAM

Boston: Pierce, Rondo, Perkins, T.Allen, Davis

Orlando: Nelson, Howard, Redick, Gortat

Cleveland: James, Varejao, Ilgauskas, Hickson, occasionally Gibson

Atlanta: Williams, Horford, Smith, Teague

Miami: Wade, Wright, Haslem, Chalmers, Beasley, occasionally Cook

Milwaukee: Jennings, Bogut, Redd, Mbah a Moute, Ilyasova, Gadzuric

Charlotte: Wallace, Felton, Augustin

Chicago: Rose, Noah, Deng, Gibson, Hinrich (all NCAA standouts, as documented in our previous post here)

Los Angeles: Fisher, Bryant, Bynum, Walton, occasionally Vujaci

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OKC: Westbrook, Harden, Collison, Durant, Green, Ibaka

San Antonio: Duncan, Parker, Ginobili, Blair, Hill

Phoenix: Nash, Stoudemire, Lopez, Dragic, Barbosa

Denver: Anthony, Hilario, Lawson, Andersen

Utah: Williams, Matthews, Fesenko, Kirilenko, Miles, Millsap

Dallas: Kidd, Nowitzki, Beaubois, Barea

Portland: Roy, Aldridge, Oden, Webster, Batum, Fernandez, Bayless

Assessing Executive Performances

In a series of three posts last year, we evaluated executive performance in 2008-09, ultimately choosing Denver's Mark Warkentien as the greatest achiever that year. Warkentien went on to win the NBA's Executive of the Year award.

This year's Executive of the Year was Milwaukee's John Hammond, who received 12 of 30 votes. The runner-up was Oklahoma City's Sam Presti, who received 9 votes. This was odd, given that (as described below) Presti did virtually nothing in the past 12 months to improve his team, other than prudent omission. It is generally recognized that the Coach of the Year award is not a prize for cumulative past deeds, but rather a bauble for punctuated single-year success (hence Jerry Sloan's failure to ever win), so why should Presti get any votes?
The voting year is generally considered to start with the 2009 NBA draft and extend until the end of the 2009-10 regular season in mid-April, when roster moves cease.

Hammond certainly has done a great job, as he built a deep and resilient roster that was able to weather season-ending injuries to Michael Redd and Andrew Bogut yet still (as of this writing) take 3 of the first 5 playoff games from the favored Atlanta Hawks. Still, I am not sure that he was the best team executive in the past 12 months.

Here are the candidates, arranged into tiers of Great, Good, OK, and Poor:

GREAT

Cleveland's Danny Ferry (drafted Christian Eyenga and Danny Green; traded Sasha Pavlovic and Ben Wallace for Shaquille O'Neal; signed Leon Powe, Anthony Parker, and Jamario Moon; traded Zydrunas Ilgauskas and a draft pick for Antawn Jamison). The trades for Shaq and Jamison were brilliant, losing no usable talent (note that Ilgauskas returned to the team 30 days after the trade) for multi-time All-Stars who help the Cavs credibly threaten Orlando. The free-agent signings of ex-Raptors Parker and Moon were also sharp, as Delonte West and LeBron James alone were not sufficient as perimeter defenders in the playoffs last year.

San Antonio's R.C. Buford (drafted Dejuan Blair, Garrett Temple, and Cedric Jackson; traded Fabricio Oberto/Kurt Thomas/Bruce Bowen for Richard Jefferson; brought Ian Mahinmi aboard the main roster from France; signed Keith Bogans and Antonio McDyess). The Spurs kept only Parker, Ginobili, Duncan, Hill, and Bonner from last year's rotation. Out went the aging Finley, Bowen, Oberto, and Thomas; younger legs including Blair, Jefferson, and Bogans (plus the admittedly mature McDyess) supplanted them. As of this writing, they lead Dallas 3-2 in their first-round playoff series. Last year Dallas won the series in five games, so at the least the Spurs have improved.

Dallas's Donnie Nelson (drafted Rodrigue Beaubois; signed Drew Gooden and Tim Thomas; traded Jerry Stackhouse/Devean George/Antoine Wright for Shawn Marion/Kris Humphries/Greg Buckner; traded Humphries/Shawne Williams for Eduardo Najera; traded Josh Howard/Gooden/James Singleton/Quentin Ross for Caron Butler/Brendan Haywood/Deshawn Stevenson). Some of the Mavs' moves seem akin to a "Flip This House" strategy, as the above transaction list clearly includes the acquisition and then abrumpt dismissal of players including Gooden and Humphries. Still, it is hard to argue against the point that they have improved their roster. Caron Butler and Shawn Marion are former All-Stars, and Brendan Haywood is an above-average defensive center. Even ignoring all the trades, they came up with a brilliant late-first-round pick by nabbing Beaubois, who has shown enticing flashes of preternatural ability.

Milwaukee's John Hammond (drafted Brandon Jennings; signed Ersan Ilyasova; traded Richard Jefferson for Kurt Thomas/Bruce Bowen/Amir Johnson; traded Amir Johnson/Sonny Weems for Roko Ukic/Carlos Delfino; traded Joe Alexander/Hakim Warrick for John Salmons; signed Jerry Stackhouse). Jennings, Ilyasova, Delfino, Salmons, and Stackhouse are now all contributing to the Bucks' playoff success. Jefferson, who starred for many years in New Jersey, disappointed in his one year in Milwaukee and is not playing much better in San Antonio; meanwhile, Kurt Thomas has played 70 games for the Bucks and contributes 4 rebounds per game from a bench position. Bowen retired and represented saved money for Milwaukee.

Orlando's Otis Smith (traded Courtney Lee and Rafer Alston for Ryan Anderson and Vince Carter; signed Matt Barnes, Jason Williams, and Brandon Bass; re-signed Marcin Gortat). Orlando made the Finals last year, and now they're even better. They are clearly the deepest team in the league. If Jameer Nelson goes down, you've got El Chocolate Blanco or Anthony Johnson. In the "bigs" rotation, you have Dwight Howard, Bass, Anderson, Gortat, Rashard Lewis, and even Adonal Foyle. Perimeter players include Carter, Barnes, mainstay J.J. Redick, and Mickael Pietrus. Nearly every guy save Bass, Gortat, Foyle, and of course Howard can easily stroke 3-pointers. The new players are clearly an upgrade on the departed Lee, Alston, Tony Battie, and Hedo Turkoglu. None of the latter four players played as well in 2009-10 as they had with Orlando.

Houston's Daryl Morey (drafted Chase Budinger; signed Trevor Ariza; traded Carl Landry and Tracy McGrady for Jordan Hill, Jared Jeffries, Kevin Martin, and draft picks). Morey's team has not appreciably improved since they came within one game of the Western Conference Finals nearly 12 months ago. The continued deterioration of Tracy McGrady and Yao Ming's chronic foot problems means that the dominant inside-outside combination that team leaders happily imagined back in 2004 will never obtain. Houston missed the playoffs this season; however, with all of the new assets in Houston, the Rox may be ready to implement a trade that will bring a star like LeBron James or Chris Bosh to lower Texas.

New York's Donnie Walsh (drafted Jordan Hill and Toney Douglas; traded Quentin Richardson for Darko Milicic; re-signed David Lee for one year; signed Earl Barron and Jonathan Bender; traded Jordan Hill, Jared Jeffries, and draft picks for Tracy McGrady; traded Milicic for Brian Cardinal). The incoming talent in these deals has not been above average. The purpose of the McGrady trade was to remove Jared Jeffries from New York's 2010-11 salary roll in order to clear salary room for a big free agent. Of course, if Isiah Thomas had not signed Jeffries to such a long contract, such a movie would not have been necessary. For Thomas's folly, the Knicks lost two future draft picks. But at least Walsh has put the Knicks in a position to potentially lure in James and Bosh. As this article makes clear, Walsh has a pretty good plan for the free-agent signing period this summer.

Charlotte's Michael Jordan (drafted Gerald Henderson Jr.; traded Emeka Okafor to New Orleans for Tyson Chandler; signed Ronald "Flip" Murray; re-signed Raymond Felton to a one-year qualifying offer; traded Raja Bell and Vlad Radmanovic for Stephen Jackson and Acie Law; traded Law, Murray, and a draft pick for Tyrus Thomas; traded a future draft pick for Theo Ratliff). To me this one is simple. The Bobcats never made the playoffs before this season. Okafor was not defensively lithe enough to gain any purchase with Dwight Howard, say. Additionally, Okafor's contract extends to June 2014, too long for a team with parlous finances. With Jackson, Chandler, and Tyrus Thomas, the Bobcats escaped the lottery.

GOOD General Managers:

Sacramento's Geoff Petrie (drafted Tyreke Evans and Omri Casspi; traded draft rights to Jeff Pendergraph for Sergio Rodriguez and draft rights to Jon Brockman; signed Sean May and Ime Udoka; traded Kevin Martin and Sergio Rodriguez for Carl Landry and Joey Dorsey). Petrie's rookies turned out great, as Evans won the ROY award, Casspi earned starter minutes with his high energy and accurate shooting, and Brockman delivered several double-digit rebounding games. I think we do not yet know enough to evaluate the Landry trade. Martin and Evans probably could not co-exist together, as Evans is not a good enough distributor to deliver the ball to Martin in prime shooting positions. Landry has completed only three pro seasons and still has time to blossom as a top-caliber PF. With a plum lottery pick upcoming, Sacramento has positioned its roster to hotly succeed in the medium term.

Chicago's John Paxson (drafted Taj Gibson; decided to let Ben Gordon sign with Detroit; traded John Salmons for Warrick and Alexander; traded Tyrus Thomas for Acie Law and Flip Murray). Like New York's Donnie Walsh, the Bulls did not make a great deal of basketball progress, losing in the first round for the second consecutive year. Taj Gibson was a very good selection at the 26th position in the first-round. (One must consider that such draft pick was acquired in February 2009 via the Bulls' trading Thabo Sefolosha, who has blossomed into a very good defender with Oklahoma City. However, in this blog post we are evaluating only 2009-10 roster moves.) Derrick Rose and Joakim Noah, the team's two best players, certainly improved to a near-All-Star level during '09-'10. The roster moves entailed the loss of some good players, with resulting 2010-11 salary room to sign even better players. We do not know whether the best of 2003's class will choose to join Chicago, but the team is positioned well.

Atlanta's Rick Sund (traded Acie Law and Speedy Claxton to Golden State for Jamal Crawford; drafted Jeff Teague; signed Joe Smith and Jason Collins). The Hawks did not fiddle much with the roster that was readily swept by Cleveland in the 2009 conference semis. Acquiring Crawford, named Sixth Man of the Year just a couple days prior, added a valuable offensive dimension to the team. However, in light of Atlanta's easy destruction in last year's playoffs, a more significant roster upgrade would have been nice. Smith and Collins have hardly played.

L.A. Clippers's Mike Dunleavy (drafted Blake Griffin; traded Zach Randolph to Memphis for Quentin Richardson; traded Q-Rich to Minnesota for Craig Smith and Sebastian Telfair; traded a draft pick to New Orleans for Rasual Butler; traded Marcus Camby for Steve Blake and Travis Outlaw; traded Telfair and Al Thornton for Drew Gooden in a four-team trade). Drafting Griffin was an obvious choice at #1, and Dunleavy did a good job jettisoning Randolph to make room for Griffin in the starting lineup. (Unfortunately, Griffin then suffered a season-ending injury in training camp. Trading Camby was wise, as the Clips have Chris Kaman and young DeAndre Jordan in the middle position. Though Camby will be a 2010 free agent, the Bird rights to Blake and Outlaw might be useful to the Clips.

Portland's Kevin Pritchard (traded Sergio Rodriguez to Sacramento for a draft pick; drafted Jeff Pendergraph, Dante Cunningham, Victor Claver, and Patrick Mills; signed Andre Miller; granted contract extensions to LaMarcus Aldridge and Brandon Roy; traded Steve Blake and Travis Outlaw to the Clippers, as noted above, for Marcus Camby; signed Marcus Camby to a two-year contract extension). With a winning and youthful core of Roy, Aldridge, Nicolas Batum, and Greg Oden, the acquisition of so many rookies was somewhat strange; at the time, more veterans like Miller would have been more useful. Then, when Oden was later injured, the Camby trade was a good way to salvage the season, preserving a nontrivial possibility of a serious playoff run. Signing Camby before the summer free-agent frenzy was a smart move.

Oklahoma City's Sam Presti (drafted James Harden and Byron Mullens; traded Chucky Atkins and Damien Wilkins for Etan Thomas and draft picks; traded rights to a European player for Eric Maynor and the injured Matt Harpring). These were good, safe movies, though Oklahoma could have done more to ready their team for a Bosh or Boozer. James Harden at #3 in the draft looks questionable now: why not a better shooter like Stephen Curry? Harden has a couple more inches, enabling him to better defend other SGs, but Curry shoots like a Swedish biathon champion.

Denver's Mark Warkentien (drafted Ty Lawson; re-signed Chris Andersen; signed Joey Graham; traded a draft pick to Detroit for Walter Sharpe and Arron Afflalo; traded Sharpe and Sonny Weems to Milwaukee for Malik Allen; traded Steven Hunter and a draft pick for Dominique Jones). Denver allowed free agents Dahntay Jones and Linas Kleiza to sign elsewhere (the latter, in Greece) Afflalo blossomed in this, his third season, filling the defensive role that Jones occupied in 2008-09. Additionally, Afflalo developed a fine three-point shooting touch and some playmaking ability. After the regular season started, the Nuggets played things chill and easy, not making any roster transactions until a couple minor signings in April to gird for the playoffs. (Unfortunately, Denver quickly lost to Utah, lost without Coach Karl.) Lawson and Afflalo are excellent building blocks for the future, and Warkentien, who won Executive of the Year in 2008-09, must get credit for that.

New Orleans's Jeff Bower (drafted Darren Collison and Marcus Thornton; traded Tyson Chandler to Charlotte for Emeka Okafor; traded Rasual Butler to the Clippers for a draft pick; traded Antonio Daniels to Minnesota for Darius Songaila and Bobby Brown; signed Ike Diogu; traded Hilton Armstrong for a draft pick; traded Devin Brown for Aaron Gray; traded Bobby Brown for a draft pick). A lot of bench-caliber players entered and exited this roster. (Free agents Jannero Pargo and Ryan Bowen also left in the summer of 2009.) Collison and Thornton were very good draft picks late in the selection process; with Chris Paul injured for most of the season, those two young guards showed that they could lead the team and/or score like a piano composer. Okafor, as noted above, has a much longer contract but lacks Chandler's injury profile, and appears an adequate replacement.

OK General Managers

Phoenix's Steve Kerr (traded Shaquille O'Neal for Sasha Pavlovic and Ben Wallace; signed Channing Frye; chose not to trade Amare Stoudemire). Phoenix did not shuffle the roster much, aside from divesting Shaq. The Suns subsequently bought out the contracts of Pavlovic and Wallace. Phoenix largely did not mess with its roster after the 2008-09 season ended; some discussion of trading Amare Stoudemire before the February '10 trade deadline led to nothing. Phoenix's bench of Lopez/Barbosa/Dudley/Amundsen/Dragic has almost uniformly improved since last season, and their stalwart starters of Nash/Stoudemire/Richardson/Hill have not lost much despite their age. Channing Frye, like many other offensive-oriented players, thrived next to Steve Nash. The Suns are back in the playoffs, showing that Kerr was effective in his restraint.

Memphis's Chris Wallace (traded Darko Milicic for Quentin Richardson; traded Richardson for Zach Randolph; drafted Hasheem Thabeet and Sam Young; traded a draft pick for Ronnie Brewer; signed Jamaal Tinsley). Drafting Hasheem Thabeet at #2 was a terrible idea, when he could have nabbed Harden, Evans, Rubio, Flynn, Curry, Jennings, or Lawson. Flipping Milicic for Zach Randolph worked well, and the acquisition of Brewer showed good foresight (though he quickly suffered a season-ending injury). With Randolph, Memphis came close to its first playoff season since 2006. Still, Hasheem Thabeet?

Boston's Danny Ainge (signed Rasheed Wallace, Shelden Williams, Marquis Daniels, and Michael Finley; re-signed Glen Davis; signed Rajon Rondo to a contract extension; traded Bill Walker and J.R. Giddens for Nate Robinson). Rondo's extension was wise, as too many teams had 2010-11 salary room and would likely throw lush money at Rondo were he to be a free agent in July '10. Most of Boston's new bench players -- Williams, Daniels, and Finley -- were injured all season and contributed little. Wallace was nominally healthy, though mostly out of shape. The Celtics have not yet returned to their championship form of 2008. If Ainge wants to prolong the Celtics' current stretch of excellence, he will need to work harder in the coming summer.

Meanwhile, the WORST GENERAL MANAGER list must surely include:

Detroit's Joe Dumars (drafted Jonas Jerebko; signed Ben Wallace, Chris Wilcox, Ben Gordon, and Charlie Villanueva). Jerebko is a nice player, but Gordon and Villanueva are badly overpaid. Surely Detroit could have done better by waiting until 2010 to commit to long-term contracts.

New Jersey's Rod Thorn (drafted Terrence Williams; traded Vince Carter and Ryan Anderson for Courtney Lee, Rafer Alston, and Tony Battie). Williams is known to be headstrong and difficult to deal with. Vince Carter is an All-NBA-caliber talent who is surely worth much more than a one-year pseudo-veteran like Courtney Lee.

Toronto's Bryan Colangelo (traded Kris Humphries and Shawn Marion for Hedo Turkoglu, Devean George, and Antoine Wright; drafted Demar DeRozan; signed Jarrett Jack; traded George to Golden State for Marco Belinelli; signed Rasho Nesterovic; traded Delfino and Ukic to Milwaukee for Johnson and Weems). Turkoglu played like dirt; meanwhile, Marion helped Dallas remain at the top of any list. DeRozan has no obviously outstanding basketball skill, while the player taken at #10 in the draft immediately after DeRozan, Brandon Jennings, challenged for Rookie of the Year. Most importantly, Colangelo did little to convince Chris Bosh that the team is headed toward championship contention anytime soon. Why should he stay?

Minnesota's David Kahn (drafted Ricky Rubio, Jonny Flynn, and Wayne Ellington; signed Ramon Sessions; traded Brian Cardinal to the Knicks for Darko Milicic). The signing of Sessions was strange when Flynn was already anointed as the new starting point guard and Rubio, also a 1, is expected to join the team in 2011. Why did Sessions deserve a four-year contract? And if Flynn is good enough to pilot the team to the playoffs, why spend a high draft pick on Rubio? The trade market is hardly liquid; Rubio may not be flippable for a player of equal talent. And why is Darko Milicic worth any sort of speculative investment?

Utah's Kevin O'Connor`(drafted Eric Maynor; signed Wesley Matthews as undrafted rookie; traded Maynor and Matt Harpring to the Thunder for a European player's draft rights; traded Ronnie Brewer to Memphis for a first-round draft pick). The Matthews signing was excellent, but as an undrafted player, and soon to be a free agent again, he is likely to attract salary offers beyond the ken of Jazz ownership. Trading away Maynor and Brewer for nothing was inexplicable. (Harpring's contract was already covered by an insurer, due to the player's career-ending injuries.)